Payam Akhavan, LL.B., LL.M, S.J.D. (Professor, McGill University Faculty of Law): Payam Akhavan is Professor of International Law at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He earned his Doctorate from Harvard Law School and was previously Senior Fellow at Yale Law School and Distinguished Visiting Professor at University of Toronto. He is the author of numerous publications and his 2001 article "Beyond Impunity" in the American Journal of International Law has been recognized as one of “the most significant published journal essays in contemporary legal studies.”

See http://www.iranhrdc.org/httpdocs/English/boardmembers.htm]

The Baha’i Community, Human Rights, and the Construction of a New Iranian Identity
A Lecture by Dr. Payam Akhavan in Chicago

February 24th, 2010

Human rights and Iranian identity

What does it mean to be Iranian? What does it mean to be a human being? These are the questions confronting theIranian

people at this crucial juncture in their long history. In the incredible and unforgettable scenes that have unfolded in the streets of Tehran, and Isfahan, and Shiraz, and Tabriz, and Mashhad, and Ahvaz, and every other city and town in Iran, we are witnessing a struggle far greater than a mere political contest between different presidential candidates. We are witnessing a struggle for the soul of the nation; a struggle to build a new identity for the Iranian people. The encounter between the protestors and their tormentors is an encounter between the dark past and the bright future. It is an encounter between violence and non-violence, between the courage of those that are willing to sacrifice their lives for justice, and the cowardice of those that savagely beat and murder the defenseless. It is an encounter between the best and worst potentials inherent in humankind.

The millions marching in the streets, youth and women, student and labour movements, intellectuals and artists, web-loggers and journalists, a social movement of unprecedented unity and resolve, have demonstrated that without legitimacy there can be no lasting power. They have demonstrated vividly the deeper meaning of the words democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; words that we throw about loosely in our world without always appreciating the price that must be paid for its attainment. The power of their demands lies in its simplicity. The Iranian people are asking whether the God that we all worship and all that we hold sacred, whether the dreams and aspirations that we have for our children, they are asking whether these do not demand that those in power treat their citizens with justice and equality? They ask why the hope of our youth in the future should be extinguished, why our mothers and sisters should be treated with such disrespect in our laws, why our workers should live in such poverty amidst our national wealth, and why a utopian ideology that has long promised both freedom and prosperity has achieved neither?

For the people of Iran, democracy and human rights are not intellectual abstractions. Freedom and tolerance are not about idle theological disputes. For them, these are existential needs in the face of a daily onslaught of violence, deception, corruption, and hatred. For them, these demands go to the very meaning of what it means to be Iranian and what it means to be a human being. What they seek simply is an Iranian nation where every citizen enjoys fundamental human rights.

Justice, equality, solidarity, a culture where religion gives people spiritual fulfillment rather than serving as a pretext for abuse of power, in struggling for this vision of what it means to be Iranian, the countless youth that have stood firm in the face of savage beatings, murders, and torture, speak to a deeper yearning within us all. Through their sacrifices they bring to life the words of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights that: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”

After thousands of years of historical evolution, through countless wars and revolutions and ideologies, humankind has arrived at the realization that the foundation of civilization and progress is recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings. That dignity is not premised on whether we belong to an approved religion or race or political ideology or social class. It is part of what it means to be and to treat others as a human being. On the bloodstained pages of contemporary history, from Nazi Germany and Cambodia to Yugoslavia and Rwanda, from Afghanistan and Iraq to Uganda and the Sudan, we witness the devastating consequences of disregarding our shared humanity. The case is no different for the thousands of our fellow Iranians, be they religious or secular, Muslim or Baha’i, Azeri, Kurdish or Baluch, republican or socialist, man and woman, whose rights have been trampled upon merely because of who they are and what they believe. In the name of Islam, in the name of the divine, those that have arrogated to themselves the right to speak on behalf of God, have murdered and tortured countless sons and daughters of this long-suffering nation. They have corrupted the spiritual longing of its people with the profane lust of wealth and power. The poor in whose name they spoke have become ever more wretched amidst the unprecedented oil wealth of the country. And the end to injustice they promised has brought stoning and hanging of “infidels” and “the corrupt on earth” and “the enemies of God”, defined as anybody who dares to challenge the absolute power of self-proclaimed leaders. Women are forcibly veiled to protect men against their own lust and treated as inferior to men that dominate and mistreat them with impunity. And those whose religion is not approved by the State cannot enjoy full rights as citizens. This is the tragedy and despair that has brought the disillusioned millions to our streets.

The denial of human rights is not only the problem of its direct victims. It is an assault on our common humanness. Nowhere is this more apparent than laws and policies that make a particular status or belief a crime. In this light, what makes the persecution of Baha’is important is not just the Baha’is themselves. When the Constitution and leaders of the Islamic Republic proclaim that citizens of Iran can be denied the right to education and lawful marriage, dispossessed of their sacred sites, cemeteries, personal property and livelihood, arrested, tortured, and murdered, and subject to slander and hate propaganda, merely because of their religion, this is a crime not just against the Baha’is, but also a crime against the Iranian people, and a crime against humanity. Evidently, the historical animosity towards the Baha’is and their violent persecution by the Islamic Republic has served a useful function of creating an imaginary enemy against which the masses can be rallied in furtherance of the political ambitions of their leaders’ pretension of divine authority. But the injustice has been not only against the Baha’is. It has also been an injustice against all Iranian citizens that long for a nation identified with justice and human rights rather than a culture of hatred, self-deception and violence.

To say that there is only one way to be Iranian, whether through the prism of religious, ethnic, or ideological absolutism that leaves no room for diversity, may be reassuring in a world of uncertainty. But it is an abdication of our responsibility to build a future based on human dignity, of shaping our destiny through enlightenment rather than the deceptive comfort of denial and ignorance. Our identity is not an ancient statue in the ruins of Persepolis waiting to be discovered. Our identity is not to be found in blind imitation of outward pretensions of religious piety. Our identity is a reflection of the moral choices that we make in today’s world and our willingness to embrace both our self and the other in a common home. Our identity is a social construction, our nation an imagined community, a shared cultural space in which the lives of our people are intertwined in a mutual search for meaning, prosperity, and progress. Our identity is not fixed in time or place. It is fluid, complex, and constantly evolving. But we have a fundamental choice. And that choice is whether we define our self through hatred or humanity.

The persecution of Baha’is in Iran is not an immutable reality; it is not an irreversible part of Iran’s future. It is merely the reflection of the identity that some have tried to impose on the Iranian people. It is the reflection of blind obedience to leaders that elevate hatred to patriotism and transform victims into aggressors. The discrimination against Baha’is, the denial of their human rights, the hate propaganda against them, these are merely a particularly notorious manifestation of a culture of exclusion and violence that has afflicted all Iranians that dare to strive for a united nation in which the equal rights of all Iranians are respected. National unity does not mean national homogeneity.

Throughout its history, Iran has been most glorious and most powerful when it has embraced the diversity of its people. The construction of imaginary enemies as an instrument of power, the instigation of hatred and violence against those that dare to be different, this is an affliction on all Iranians, because they stand to lose a future in which their children will live in equality, dignity, and prosperity. By investing so much energy into hate propaganda to blame the Baha’is for all the evils of the world, Iran’s leaders are only confirming the bankruptcy of their own ideas. They are confirming yet again the irrelevance of a backward ideology that only serves the interests of those in power. Will convincing people that all Baha’is are Israeli spies and American agents help explain why Iran’s oil wealth has been squandered while people sink into ever greater poverty and misery? Will it explain why our brightest minds are leaving Iran at an accelerating pace? Will it explain why our extraordinary women are treated with such contempt and violence when they merely ask for respect and equality?

Religion and Power

In understanding the logic of hate-mongering against Baha’is, we have to begin from the premise of power rather than religion. The symbolic imagery of political Islam, its search for an authentic self in an imagined past, is often misconceived as a retreat against modernity. But far from being an answer to “Westoxication” (qarb-zadegi), it replicates the structures and ideologies of Western modernity in the clothing of Islam and cultural authenticity. Despite its peculiarities as a tradition-bound theocracy, the Islamic Republic of Iran shares the essential characteristics of other modern authoritarian States. The torture chambers of Evin prison, the disappearance and murder of dissidents, executions based on show trials, forced confessions and television propaganda to create an appearance of legitimacy, these reflect familiar patterns of abuse and control. As Professor Reza Afshari notes in a rebuke of cultural relativist claims by the Islamic Republic: “Claiming authenticity in tradition, while struggling to seize the commanding heights of the modern state, is a spectacular political double-cross.”

Theories of religious or ethnic conflict often overlook or belittle the importance of hate-mongering and incitement to violence as a pre-meditated instrument of political control. During the Yugoslav conflict for instance, it was fashionable to subscribe to Professor Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory as an explanation for the “ethnic cleansing” campaign against Bosnian Muslims. I was serving with the United Nations in Bosnia at that time and was astonished that this had become a prevalent view of the conflict. In Sarajevo, every person that I met came from a mixed marriage and for centuries this city had been a haven of religious tolerance. The reality was that it took a steady stream of myth, fantasy, half-truths, blatant lies, and conspiracy theories emanating from the State-controlled media, to persuade the Serbs that they must all blindly unite behind Slobodan Milošević against the imaginary Muslim enemy. The gradual blurring of the line between truth and illusion reached its apotheosis when the masters of demonology in the Serbian media claimed that the Muslims themselves were responsible for the February 1994 mortar attack on the Sarajevo market that killed sixty-eight civilians.

The persecution of the Baha’i minority is perhaps the most flagrant instance of such demonology in contemporary Iran. Although religious minorities such as Sufis, Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, Sunni Muslims, as well as Shi’a reformists and even orthodox Shi’a clerics opposed to the Velayat-e-Faqih have suffered human rights violations, they are recognized as “people of the book” whereas the Baha’is enjoy no constitutional recognition or protections. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, clerics deemed all Baha’is as heretics whose blood may be shed with impunity (mahdur ad-dam), save those that recant their faith and “return” to the “true” religion of Islam, as interpreted by the State-sanctioned clerics of course. The accusations against them included everything the clerics held in their conspiratorial phantasm, such as espionage for America, Britain, and Israel, collaboration with the Shah’s regime, serving as agents of British, Russian, and Ottoman imperialism, and even collaborators of Wahabism.

Many dissidents in Iran are accused of being a Baha’i and it seems that our numbers have increased dramatically thanks to these accusations! When the writer Hadi Khorsandi was accused of being a Baha’i, he wrote to his friend and said: “I have good news! I just discovered I am a Baha’i. I am trying to determine the exact time but I am not sure. Maybe it was at 4:35 in the afternoon. Anyhow, I know that this has been achieved through inside influence (party bazi) because Baha’is are decent people and they would never accept a drunken gambler like me!”

In 1987, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran reported that the persecution of Baha’is included “torture, arbitrary imprisonment, denial of education and employment, arbitrary seizure of homes and possessions, confiscation of community assets, and seizure, desecration and destruction of holy places.” As “unprotected infidels”, Baha’is were legal non-persons and denied redress through the courts. For instance, on 21 September 1993, the court in the city of Shahr-e Rey failed to impose a penalty on two killers because the murdered man was, in the language of the verdict, “a member of the misled and misleading sect of Baha’ism.” This amounts to judicial approval of murder based solely on the religious beliefs of the victim. A more fundamental negation of human rights cannot be imagined.

The ideological constructions that justify violence against Baha’is have very little to do with religion. The persecution is not about theological differences. It is not about the merit of arguments on the interpretation of Quranic texts or traditions. The persecution is about how differences are accommodated in an authoritarian political system rather than a government ruled by human rights and democratic freedoms. Professor Mohammad Tavakoli points to the historical roots of contemporary anti-Bahá’i sentiments, observing that:

“the scapegoating of Babis was actively promoted by the Qajar state at a time when it faced a serious crisis of legitimacy. To win over the Shiite seminarians and ulama, the Qajar statesmen initiated a well-orchestrated public anti-Babi campaign. By concurrently ‘othering’ Babis and stressing some national religious traditions … the Qajar state actively promoted Shiism as the core of modern Iranian identity.” (Mohammad Tavakoli-Targhi, “Anti-Baha’ism and Islamism in Iran, 1941-1955”, Iran Name, Vol. XIX, Nos. 1-2, Winter & Spring 2001.)

Professor Tavakoli points out that the violent persecution of Baha’is was not the inevitable expression of religious differences: “Instead of encountering the Babis in a seminarian style of dialogue and debate, and thus fostering the formation of a national democratic public sphere, the Shia’ hierarchy opted for a violently repressive mode of encounter with Babis and Baha’is.” Accusations of Babism, he observes, were utilized “as an effective instrument for silencing the voices of dissent in the formative phase of modern Iranian polity.” It is in this respect that the emancipation of Baha’is is a litmus test for human rights in Iran. Evidently, the arrogation by the Islamic Republic of the right to exclude the largest religious minority in Iran from the pale of legal protection, and the attendant political culture of hate-mongering, are fundamentally incompatible with any reasonable conception of democracy. And so long as this hate-mongering and scape-goating against Baha’is is a feature of the Iranian political culture, the prospects of realizing human rights and freedoms will remain remote.

Towards a New Iranian Identity

There are in today’s Iran the unmistakable signs of a new beginning. Against the onslaught of violence, a different and better future is taking shape. Thirty years after the revolution, the romantic view of the Islamic Republic has given way to a sober understanding of the realities of ideological absolutism and political authoritarianism. In the midst of the uncertainties and dislocations of the transition from tradition to modernity, faced with the challenges for globalization on our national self-conception, we have experimented with a social revolution that has profoundly altered Iran. Like most other political ideologies, the utopia that it promised to its followers has not been realized. On the contrary, the revolution has eaten many of its own children who are now the dissidents and opponents that languish in the same prisons that the revolution was intended to shut down. Iran is today a nation of 70 million among whom 70% are under thirty years of age. This youthful generation is disillusioned, pragmatic, and not content with revolutionary ideological explanations of their bleak future amidst economic and social decline. This youthful generation is internet saavy, glued to satellite television, and aware of the world beyond Iran’s borders. The unprecedented protests demonstrate that this generation is not inclined to embrace hatred as its national identity. The Iranian people have awakened to the fact that the momentary comfort of chanting death to imaginary foreign enemies in the midst of an excited crowd is far outweighed by the profound damage that it does to the well-being of a people, to their capacity to live a life of peace and happiness.

Recently, I learned first-hand the measure of desperation of leaders that continue their hate-mongering against a peaceful religious minority while the Iranian people, seeking freedom and prosperity, sinks into ever greater misery. During the summer of 2008, the Islamic Republic News Agency published a story in which they accused me of having converted my student at McGill University, Nargess Tavasolian who is Shirin Ebadi’s daughter, to the Baha’i faith. The article suggested that McGill is a notorious centre of Zionism and Baha’ism, that I worked for the CIA, and that Nargess had proven her disloyalty to the revolution by writing her thesis on the incompatibility of certain Islamic punishments with human rights. This was a clear attempt to defame Mrs. Ebadi for her human rights activities and for agreeing to represent the seven Baha’i “friends” (yaran) who had earlier been arrested on espionage charges in May of that year. Some months earlier, Mrs. Ebadi had received death threats from a secret anti-Baha’i organization and it now became clear that this was part of a campaign of slander and intimidation by the Islamic Republic. What astonished me about this article was the fact that the mere suggestion that Nargess was now a Baha’i was in the eyes of the government propaganda machine the worst insult and accusation imaginable against Mrs. Ebadi! I was equally amazed that the government would have an informant at McGill University to gather information even on Nargess’s thesis topic! Surely there are better ways to spend the Iranian people’s money rather than spying on my poor student! And while McGill was defamed as a nest of Israeli and Baha’i spies, the children of prominent clerics, including Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, have been educated at the exact same institution! This attack was clearly a mark of desperation by those that have nothing else to offer the Iranian people except weaving conspiracies and creating imaginary enemies. They must be commended for their creativity but not their wisdom. Their desperate attacks were the catalyst for an unprecedented outpouring of sympathy and support by Iranians in favour of the Baha’is.

In response to the Islamic Republic’s propaganda, Iranian intellectuals and activists demonstrated an unprecedented solidarity with the Baha’is. Among these, I wish to point out my dear friend Khosro Shemiranie, a prominent Iranian journalist from Montreal, who wrote that: “If we truly are defenders of the right of all humans, now is the time to raise our voice in unison and cry aloud: For as long as the followers of the Bahai Faith are suppressed and imprisoned for their religion and convictions, we are all Bahais!” Others like the famous human rights activist and icon of the 18 Tir student demonstrations in 1999, Ahmad Batebi, asked why the Islamic Republic: “having thorough command over all financial and media resources of the nation, and maintaining belief and insistence on its own divine and absolutely unquestioned mandate and ideology … and its persistent injection of this belief into all elements of the nation, so afraid of any contact between the people and not only the Bahais but every religious minority group?” The voices of support in this unprecedented reversal of 150 years of intolerance includes no less than Grand Ayatollah Montazeri who also issued a now legendary fatwa stating that Baha’is should enjoy the same rights as other Iranian citizens. Even two of the leading candidates in the June presidential elections saw fit to mention that Baha’is should enjoy equal rights. They did so because they knew that the Iranian people, especially the new generation of youth, are less and less willing to accept an identity built on hatred and exclusion. Iranian student leaders have demanded the right of Baha’is to university education and during the protests in the streets some were filmed chanting: “Ahle hag natarsid, hamayatat mikonim (“Oh people of Truth, do not be afraid we support you”.) Others were chanting: “Bahá’í, Bahá’í, hemaayatat mikonim” (“Bahá’ís we will support you.”) Many of us never imagined we would live to see this day. Seeing these videos, I thought I was dreaming. These remarkable developments are unquestionably the beginning of a new conception of what it means to be Iranian, what it means to be a citizen with equal rights, and what it means to be a human being.

Hatred and identity

The suffering of the Baha’is is not because of anything the Baha’is have done. Their suffering is merely a reflection of how their tormentors choose to construct their identity. To define a nation, a religion, a revolution, through hatred and imagined enemies, is an injustice against those that are the victims of such hatred. But it is also an injustice against those that perpetuate such hatred. To treat others with inhumanity is to deny our own humanity. To behave unjustly towards others is to negate our own inherent nobility.

A story from the youth of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre explains the role that hatred plays in shaping our self-conception. He tells of a classmate who failed an exam on French literature while a Jew, the son of immigrants from Eastern Europe, had passed. Sartre’s classmate resented that a Jew could understand French poetry better than a true Frenchman like himself. He admitted that he had not studied for this subject which he did not enjoy. But the explanation for his failure was based on his dislike of the Jew rather than his own actions. Sartre writes that: “Far from experience producing his idea of the Jew, it was the latter which explained his experience. If the Jew did not exist, the anti-Semite would invent him.” This reminded me of an almost identical story my father told me about his childhood when he was vilified by his teacher for having mastered his lessons in the Quran better than a Muslim child. The evils attributed to the Baha’is do not arise from experience or historical fact. Their demonization arises from anti-Baha’ism which either distorts or invents experience and historical fact to suit the tormentor’s purposes. Baseless accusations, distortion and fabrication of historical facts, conspiracies linking Baha’is with Russian and British Imperialism, with Wahabism and Zionism, with American conspiracies, the portrayal of Baha’is as “foreign” agents, as enemies of Islam and traitors to Iran, the depiction of Baha’is women as promiscuous, seducing pious Muslims into joining a “wayward sect”, these outrageous constructions in the perverse imagination of the hate-mongers says far more about their self-conception, their needs and purposes, than it says anything about the Baha’is. For such people, the Baha’is are a blank screen on which they can project all the fears and fantasies of their own making, all the negative qualities that threaten and endanger them. So it can be said that if Baha’is did not exist, they would be invented by the anti-Baha’is!

To seek the truth is to invite uncertainty. To search for answers in our longing for transcendence, for an elevated spiritual existence, we cannot avoid the frightening realization that we are not in control, that our reasoning is at best tentative, that new realities may intervene to cast doubt on time-cherished beliefs and assumptions. Where fear keeps us back from our journey, love propels us forward, and allows us to abandon our idols and vain imaginings as the price of union with our beloved. Those who define their self by hatred of others are searching for comfort, for avoiding the terrifying uncertainty and ineffability of truth. The anti-Baha’is have chosen hatred because hatred is their faith. That is how they choose to interpret the sacred text of the Quran, that is how they choose to define patriotism as Iranians. In doing so, they escape responsibility and doubt. They can blame everything on the Baha’is; for them reason is not an obstacle, because their simplistic creed of hatred provides all the answers, however illogical and contradictory it may be. In joining the violent mob, in chanting death to others, in deluding himself that murdering the “infidel” will bring divine blessings, the anti-Baha’i is made to feel good, and virtuous, and powerful, and to forget his feelings of inferiority, his guilt for abandoning responsibility and the demise of his nation. In the crowd, in the trance-inducing cries of hatred, he discovers a false identity by losing his inner-self, by fleeing the promptings of his conscience and the painful longing for truth, by opting instead for self-deception through an easily accessible and seemingly permanent but utterly hollow belief, devoid of humanity, without even a hint of the spiritual transcendence that unites man with his creator. In this way, the man who lives by hating others is a coward that cannot admit his cowardice to himself.

The emancipation of the Baha’is is also about the emancipation of Iran. It is about emancipation from hatred, ignorance, and violence. It is about building a future in which a divided and backward looking Iran is transformed into a nation that unites its diverse peoples under the banner of human dignity and true civilization and reclaims its place as a leader among nations; an Iran in which the measure of patriotism will be compassion and respect for the rights of all Iranian citizens. At long last, that day is within our reach. But a long and tortuous road lays ahead, and each and every one of us must arise in solidarity with the Iranian people, to struggle for a common justice, and to contribute his share at this unique moment in the history of our beloved home.

Source: Gozaar, A Forum on Human Rights and Democracy in Iran

[Editor’s Note: Iran Press Watch has recently published a number of articles by qualified authors in an effort to make the Iranian legal framework accessible to the readers. Recently, in this series you can read “Iranian Islam, not the Yaran, on trial in the court of international opinion,” and “The Trial of the Yaran under Iranian Criminal Procedure: ‘The Justice of God’ or Procedural Injustice?” by Dr. Christopher Buck. Now we are happy to provide a translation of a portion of a piece of legislation, “Respecting Legitimate Freedoms and Protecting Citizens' Rights,” adopted in Iran on 4th of May, 2004. The translation is by Mr. Omid Ghaemmaghami, a doctoral student at the University of Toronto.]

Respecting Legitimate Freedoms and Protecting Citizens’ Rights

“Single Act”: From the date of the adoption of this statute, all public tribunals, Revolutionary Courts, military courts, public prosecutor offices, and judicial officials are bound to observe the provisions articulated below in carrying out their legal duties. Violators will be prosecuted to face punishment, as prescribed by law.

1. The investigation and prosecution of crimes, the performance of searches, and the issuance of rulings governing security and temporary arrests must be based on the law, and must result from judicial decisions and warrants that are clear and transparent. Investigators, prosecutors and judges must set aside all personal interests and eschew the abuse of power or any act of violence or undue detention.

2. Convictions must be in accordance with legal procedures and should be restricted to those who commit the crime and their accessories. Until such time as the crime has been established in a court of law and a verdict that is based on sound arguments and supported by legal evidence or based on sources of religious jurisprudence (in the event that legal evidence is not available), the defendant is presumed innocent. Each person is entitled to protection under the law.

3. The court and the public prosecutor’s office must not deprive defendants and the accused of the right to a legal defense, and must always provide the accused an opportunity to seek the counsel of an attorney or [legal] expert.

4. Islamic ethics and rules of conduct must be completely observed in dealing with the complainant, the accused, the perpetrator of a crime, or any source with information about the crime, as well as in the performance of all assigned duties.

5. The guiding principle that individuals should not be arrested or detained without due process demands that all necessary arrests and convictions follow the procedures and conventions that have been determined by the law. In the event of a moratorium, the file must be sent to the appropriate judicial authorities, and the family of the detained must be apprised of any and all developments.

6. During the arrest and interrogation or search of individuals, [the authorities] must avoid harassing individuals by blindfolding, shackling, humiliating or demeaning them.

7. Interrogators and investigators must not cover the faces of the accused, nor sit behind them [during an interrogation], nor transfer them to an unknown place. They must not use any unconventional methods [of interrogation]. Instead, they should rely wholly on controlled, proper methods of investigation and modern techniques of interrogation.

8. Local inspection and investigations aimed at arresting fugitives or locating machinery or equipment related to a crime must be in accordance with the stipulations of the law. No attempt may be made to harass anyone. All precautions must be observed. Officials must refrain from inflicting harm to documents or objects that are not related to the crime or the accused. They may not attempt to reveal the contents of letters or private documents, nor display family pictures and home movies and tapes [to the public].

9. All manner of torture of the accused to obtain a confession or force him to do anything else is prohibited. Any confessions obtained through torture have no legal merit or legitimacy.

10. Investigations and interrogations must be supervised and completed by individuals with prior training, and be based on balanced principles and procedures of the law. Those who choose to ignore these stipulations and resort to illegal measures in the performance of their duties will face prosecution with severe consequences.

11. Questions [posed by the interrogator] must be clear, purposeful, and related directly or indirectly to the accusations. Curiosity about private personal and family matters, questions about previous transgressions or queries into issues that are unrelated to the case must be avoided.

12. Responses must be recorded as they are stated without any changes or amendments, and then must be read back to the accused. Those who are literate may write their own responses if they wish, so that no doubts about distortion or misrepresentation may be created.

13. The court and the public prosecutor’s office must oversee the detention centers and the special rules that govern their work. They are also responsible for supervising how officers and officials treat the accused. They must encourage and appreciate those officials who act in compliance with legal stipulations, and prosecute those who circumvent and transgress the same.

14. The improper spending of funds or use of belongings seized from the accused must be avoided. As soon as possible, a ruling or decision must be issued by the court, and the public prosecutor will determine what will happen with the accused’s belongings. Until such time that a ruling is reached, all precautions must be to taken to protect such belongings; under no circumstances may they be subject to personal or administrative use.

15. The head of the judiciary must appoint a committee to supervise the implementation of the above provisions. All departments that are in some way affected by this law must cooperate with this committee. The committee has the duty to prosecute those whom it finds to be in violation of these provisions. It must also work to correct any deficiencies in procedures, and bring them into compliance with these legal stipulations. It must prosecute violators severely, and must report all its actions to the head of the judiciary.

The above legislation consisting of a “single Act” was ratified by the Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran in open session on Tuesday, 4 May 2004. It was endorsed by the Guardian Council of the Constitution on 5 May 2004.

Mehdi Karroubi, Speaker of Parliament

Source: You can see the original text of the legislation at Iran’s Bureau of International Affairs’ official web site: http://www.bia-judiciary.ir/tabid/144/Default.aspx

by Christopher Buck, Ph.D., J.D.

[Editor: Iran Press Watch welcomes back Dr. Christopher Buck, a distinguished legal scholar. While most writers expose the injustice of Iranian practice in contrast with the international practice, Dr. Buck demonstrates how the current treatment of the Yaran is even problematic within the context of Iran's own legal framework. Dr Buck's article comes in a critical time when in two short days, on the 7th of February, 2010, the second trial of Yaran is scheduled to take place. The Baha'i Communities around the world are holding devotional gatherings as a response to the call of the Universal House of Justice, the international governing body of the Baha'i Community: "The prayers offered by the  [Baha'is] … worldwide have been a constant source of comfort and support to the  former members of the Yaran who have withstood their long ordeal with heroic  fortitude and patience.” With these thoughts in mind we invite you to consider the discourse by Dr. Buck.]

Part I:
The “Justice of Islam,” Jurisdiction and Venue, Prosecution and Indictment

The trial of the Yaran, the “first session” of which took place on January 12, 2010, is being conducted under the current system of Iranian criminal procedure, a creature of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Just as my previous article, “Iranian Islam, not the Yaran, on trial in the court of international opinion” (published by Iran Press Watch on January 12, 2010, the day of the first session of the trial of the Yaran), was an effort to show how the treatment of the Yaran reflects poorly on Iranian Islam inasmuch as the “Justice of Islam” is concerned, the present article demonstrates how, by Iranian legal standards, the treatment of the Yaran is in clear violation of the current Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its existing Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP).

Both articles, therefore, are essentially “Iranian” and “Islamic” arguments. I have not seen this approach taken by others. While the international community is interested to know how the treatment of the Yaran violates international standards, I believe that the Iranian audience would like to know how the legal course of the case of the Yaran is problematic within the Iranian legal context itself. This is not an easy task for anyone who has to comprehend a completely different system of criminal procedure for the first time. Consequently, I add this disclaimer: that my understanding of Iranian law is imperfect, to say the least; yet I have made every attempt to ground my argument in clearly documented principles of Iranian criminal procedure.

The Yaran — who have been held in the notorious Evin Prison since the spring of 2008 — are represented by four lawyers from the Center for the Defense of Human Rights based in Tehran — Ms. Shirin Ebadi (Iran’s first female judge prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003), Mr. Abdolfattah Soltani (co-founder of the Center for the Defense of Human Rights), Mr. Hadi Esma’ilzadeh and Ms. Mahnaz Parakand. The latter two, Mr. Esma’ilzadeh and Ms. Parakand, took part in the hearing on January 12, 2010 and represented the accused, as Ms. Ebadi is out of the country. Mr. Soltani was unavailable, having been twice imprisoned previously.

“Representation” was unduly restrictive. Shortly after the trial, Ms. Ebadi commented: “When I and my colleagues accepted to act as their defense lawyers, they [detainees] had not been allowed to see their families for over a year. And for some time too, they were not allowed to meet with us. After a year and a half when the investigation ended, I and the rest of the lawyers were permitted to read the dossier and we met them on one occasion in prison.” (“Iran’s Ebadi says seven Baha’is must be acquitted.” Washington TV. Online at http://televisionwashington.com/floater_article1.aspx?lang=en&t=1&id=17143.)

The purpose of this article is to help render translucent the otherwise opaque system of Iranian criminal procedure, which will never be fully transparent. See, e.g., Richard Vogler, “Islamic Criminal Justice: Theocratic Inquisitoriality,” A World View of Criminal Justice (Hants, UK/Burlington, VY: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 105–126.

As a general rule, Islamic jurisprudence does not recognize the primacy of rights that exist under Western legal systems, but stresses the paramount importance of duties under Islamic religious law. Iran is no exception. Whatever fundamental human rights protected under international law are ostensibly enshrined in the Iranian Constitution, such rights are qualified by subjecting them to ill-defined “Islamic criteria.” Any attempt to modernize the Iranian Islamic criminal justice system so as to be compatible with progressive international human rights standards will be doomed to frustration and failure, to the extent that the goals and requirements of Shari‘a law are not met. Their reconciliation is, frankly, impossible.

Consequently, Iran’s authoritarian criminal justice has obvious conflicts with international human rights standards, thus tempting a hasty generalization that Islam and human rights are incompatible. The reader, however, should resist this conclusion by understanding that the Iranian system is not a definitive “Islamic” legal system (a consensus on which simply does not exist). Indeed, Vogler describes the new Iranian criminal justice system as, inter alia, one that “massively overcriminalises” and which may be characterized as “discriminatory, disruptive and a criminogenic endeavour” (124, citations omitted), although, to be fair, some Iranian reformers have been calling for a paradigm shift in the application of Islamic law.

The present writer’s primary, but not exclusive, source of information regarding the current system of Iranian criminal procedure is a peer-reviewed article: Hassan Rezaei, “The Iranian Criminal Justice under the Islamization Project,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 10.1 (2002): 54–69. Rezaei notes that the current “project of Islamization of criminal justice” has, in practice, catered mainly to “the interests of the political clergy which determined the guidelines of Islamization, not the ultimate goals of Islamic law.” (Rezaei 2002, 68.) Rezaei accentuates the tension between the concept of rights under Western law and the concept of duties under Islamic law: “Observing the difference between the language of modern law under the rubric of rights and the field of Islamic law, which deals with duties, illustrates the depth of the rift between the secular and religious legal theories. Thus the notion of ‘God’s right’ in prosecution of offences and punishment is quite peculiar.” (Rezaei 2002, 64.) This dichotomy is instructive, and the reader should bear in mind that the entire notion of “justice” under Islamic law is radically different from the prevailing notions of justice under Western systems of criminal law and procedure.

Since Iran currently does not respect or abide by international human rights standards, as I have previously argued, it should be pointed out that Iran is also a signatory to “The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam” (CDHRI), Adopted and Issued at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Cairo on 5 August 1990. See http://www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/cairohrislam1990.htm. In the Part III of this article, the principles enshrined in this document will be applied to the case of the Yaran.

The “Justice of Islam”
The “Code of Criminal Procedure of the Public and Revolutionary Courts” (CCP) was passed by the Iranian Parliament on September 20, 1999, and came into force on 26 October 1999. The system of criminal procedure that now prevails in Iran is predicated, in part, on the principle of “the Justice of God in creation and legislation.”

Rezaei observes that the Iranian criminal justice system is unique in that it is predicated on the Iranian (i.e., Shi’i) interpretation of Islamic law: “Since the principal aim of drastic changes in the Iranian criminal justice was the application of the divine laws, the features of Iranian criminal justice are different from all other forms of contemporary criminal justice reforms in the West. It may therefore be regarded as a fascinating subject for comparative criminal justice scholars, whose interest is the study of the full range of possible legal phenomena.” (Rezaei 2002, 55.)

However, serious questions have been raised, both within Iran and in the international community at large, as to how procedurally fair and just this system of the “Justice of Islam” really is, when principle is put into practice. According to Rezaei, it is primarily the Revolutionary Courts that have, so far, drawn international criticism:

Rather than being Islamic and fair, the history of the last 20 years shows that these courts are in fact revolutionary and arbitrary. Most of the criticism of the international human rights organizations against Iran is based on the practice of these courts. The judges of these courts are mostly clerics with no, or little, knowledge of legal matters, and for this reason they are rarely satisfied with the presence of defence counsel in their proceedings. These Courts created ecclesiastical tribunals having no basis in the law. The procedure of these tribunals also departed from the strict requirements of proof and safeguards for the defence. Initially, the verdicts of these Courts, inspired from the Islamic system of Qadi Justice, were final, and were enforced without any judicial review. It was only in 1988 that a right of appeal was provided. Proceedings have largely taken place in secret and defendants are rarely given the opportunity to have defence counsel. (Rezaei 2002, 62–63.)

The Revolutionary Courts of the Islamic Republic are based on an inquisitorial system, rather than an adversarial system, as exists in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere throughout the West and the developing world. The judge serves as prosecutor, judge and jury, as well as arbiter. In a word, the judge is an all-powerful authority in any case over which he presides.

In the West, a judge without legal training would be as untenable as it would be unthinkable. In Iran, by contrast, judges generally have no legal training whatsoever. By 1981, the Iranian judiciary was purged of judges who had been trained in law schools. Trained jurists were replaced by untrained seminary graduates and students, as well as by political appointees. By law, Iranian judges today are only required to have a high school diploma. Their primary qualification is unswerving adherence to the Islamic Republic’s tenets. An Iranian judge is typically characterized by partiality rather than by impartiality.

Article 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the decisions of the Revolutionary Courts (and of the Common Courts) are final, except when the punishment handed down is severe — such as in cases involving the death penalty, in which the case can be appealed to the Supreme Court, which is Iran’s highest judicial authority, as vested under Article 161 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, adopted October 23, 1979, amended July 28, 1989. It remains to be seen what the verdict will be, when judgment is rendered in the trial of the Yaran. If the verdict is severe, as it is expected to be, whether the Supreme Court will hear an appeal is pure speculation at this point.

Thus, the implementation of the “Justice of Islam” in principle has, in practice, been one of procedural injustice, tempting a verdict of the “Injustice of [Iranian] Islam” by prevailing international standards. This verdict may be underscored by the existence of torture and rape complexes within the Iranian archipelago of prisons. As 2003 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Shirin Ebadi, recently commented: “Unfortunately, for some time now, the Judiciary has distanced itself from justice.” (See “Iran’s Ebadi says seven Baha’is must be acquitted,” Iran Press Watch, January 13, 2010)

In the course of the present writer’s analysis, an effort will be made to “judge” the course of this trial in accordance with Iran’s own procedural standards. This is a more challenging standard by which to judge the procedural aspects of the trial of the Yaran, since Iran has effectively distanced itself from the due process revolution that has taken place worldwide since World War II.

Ms. Ebadi, as lead defense attorney for the Baha’i seven, the Yaran, has criticized the trial of the Yaran squarely on procedural grounds, independent of the merits of the case and apart from the substantive (or insubstantive) basis of the charges themselves, each of which, as capital offenses, may carry the death penalty: “This case was set up wrongly from the start, that is, my clients should have been released immediately. This delay which has lasted up to now is a contravention of the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” (See “Iran’s Ebadi says seven Baha’is must be acquitted,” Iran Press Watch, January 13, 2010.) Here, Ms. Ebadi, who has a far greater knowledge of Iranian criminal procedure than the present writer, argues that the Yaran should have been released (and, presumably, charges dismissed) on procedural grounds alone. On comparative grounds, notably absent from Iranian criminal procedure is the notion of “probable cause” which apparently does not have to be demonstrated as a precondition of arrest and “temporary” detention.

The Baha’i International Community has noted (http://news.bahai.org/story/753) that the January 12, 2010 trial in Tehran was marked by “numerous violations” of legal due process. Both domestically and internationally, the trial of the Yaran has been roundly criticized. But whether counsel for the defense can move for a mistrial would have to be addressed under a separate legal analysis.

Jurisdiction and Venue
Jurisdictionally, this case is being tried by the Revolutionary Court, which is essentially a security court. Revolutionary Courts were established in July 1994 under the so-called “Act of Establishing Public and Revolutionary Courts.” Article 5 of the 1994 Act sets forth the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts:

Revolutionary Courts as may be required in number shall be formed in each provincial capital and in the districts determined by the head of the judiciary and under the administrative supervision and legal authority of the judicial districts to investigate the following offences:

1. Any crime against the domestic or foreign security of the Islamic Republic of Iran and corruption on earth.
2. Any act amounting to an affront against the founder of the Islamic Republic and/or its leader.
3. Any conspiracy or plot against the Islamic Republic of Iran or any armed uprising, terrorism or demolition of public buildings or facilities with the aim of confronting the Islamic government of the country.
4. Spying for foreigners.
5. Drug trafficking or related crimes.
6. Suits filed under Article 49 of the Constitution (related to the confiscation of illicitly obtained wealth).

Here, the Revolutionary Court in Tehran has properly exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with the charges of the alleged espionage — in which the Yaran, curiously, have been charged with acting as agents for America and Israel, allegedly acting against the security interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and allegedly engaging in propaganda against the Islamic Republic’s system — with each these charges having been strenuously denied by counsel for the accused. Although the venue is proper, there are serious problems with other procedural aspects of this case under Iranian criminal procedure.

Prosecution and Indictment
Briefly, there are serious problems with the merits of this case. Without any real grounding in evidence, the charges cannot withstand scrutiny. As to the charge of “espionage,” on comparative legal grounds, this case bears no facial semblance to any act of “classical spying” that is criminalized under any statutory “Espionage Act” under any other system of jurisprudence. Therefore, I can only conclude that the prosecution, on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Iran, cannot meet its burden of proof by laying out a prima facie case for espionage.

In the West, espionage statutes are typically explicit in phrasing the crime of espionage as an act of obtaining information relating to the national defense to be used to the advantage of any foreign nation (often with no distinction made between friend or enemy). In light of the foregoing, what “state secrets” have been compromised? Where is the threat to the State’s external security and internal stability? The accused are not agents of Israel, nor of America. They are not even “minor” espionage agents. In fact, there is not a shred of evidence that any of the seven accused were involved with any known conspiracy, nor has the Court made any attempt to provide any such evidence to the counsel for the accused, nor has any such evidence ever been published.

Provision for capital punishment in case of acts of espionage and treason is based on the tenet that forfeiture of the life of the spy or traitor will serve as a deterrent to those who may thereafter be tempted to commit similar acts. Instantly, this social policy would be frustrated by the wrong outcome in this case. Here, where there is no identifiable act of espionage or treason, any guilty verdict would work a manifest injustice.

However, it is not the purpose of this article to offer a detailed, substantive defense of the Yaran, as the primary focus of this article is to provide a fairly objective analysis of the legal treatment of the Yaran under Iranian criminal procedure. This is a challenging task for two reasons: (1) information on the legal details pertaining to the case of the Yaran is extremely limited; and (2) information on the intricacies of Iranian criminal procedure (especially as regards the exceptions to black letter Iranian law) is also limited, although there is sufficient information available in order to make this analysis possible.

The principal difference between the new “Islamized” system (i.e., supposedly compatible with Shi’i Islamic criteria) and the former Iranian criminal procedural system (under the former Shah of Iran) is that all judicial procedures take place under the supervision of the Court. Thus, the pre-court prosecutorial indictment was removed. There is now no formal pre-trial indictment process under the current system. Instead, the explanation of the charge is regarded as the indictment itself. There is still a “Prosecutor’s Office” under the current system, but pre-trial prosecutorial indictment has been dispensed with entirely.

This procedure is in clear contradiction with Article 37 of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic. Article 37 commands: “Innocence is to be assumed and no one is to be held guilty of a charge unless his or her guilt has been established by a competent court.” The majority of Iran’s people were not previously aware of this problem. However, during the 1999 trial against the mayor of Teheran, Mr. Karbaschi, which was broadcast on Iranian television, this contradiction was publicly disclosed. Since then, the general consensus is that the new Iranian system of criminal procedure cannot preserve impartiality.

Thus the indictment was effectively conducted in the hearing that recently took place on January 12, 2010, when the Yaran were accused of “spying for America and Israel, acting against national security and [engaging in] propaganda against the [Islamic Republic’s] system.” (See “Iran’s Ebadi says seven Baha’is must be acquitted,” Iran Press Watch, January 13, 2010.) It would appear that the charge of espionage on behalf of America has been added to the previously announced charge of spying for Israel.

In spite of the request by defense counsel, the Court ruled that the hearing would be held behind closed doors, and required that relatives of the accused leave the courtroom. (See “Iran’s Ebadi says seven Baha’is must be acquitted,” Iran Press Watch, January 13, 2010.) On the same day as the trial, the European Union was quick to react, demanding that international norms be applied: “The EU calls for a just, fair and open trial respecting all international standards and obligations.” Whether or not this trial may be considered “just” or “fair” by Iranian standards, it is quite clear that the Iranian judiciary will not respect international standards and obligations, and has turned a deaf ear to the EU’s call for an “open trial.” Indeed, current Iranian criminal procedure is far from “open.”

Prior to the commencement of trial on January 12, 2010, the Baha’i seven were technically under temporary detention. Article 132 provides that “for the purpose of having access to the accused and his due appearance before the court when necessary, and to avoid absconding or hiding or interfering with others, the judge, after explaining the charge to the accused, shall use one of the following guarantees: (1) Obligation under the word of honor to appear before the court; (2) Obligation under bail to appear before the court until the trial has finished and the judgment has been enforced. In case of non-appearance, this shall be converted to surety; (3) Surety; (4) Pawn, including a sum of money or bank guarantee or real or personal property; (5) Temporary detention in accordance with rules.”

Here, the Yaran are perceived as a security risk, and thus release under the “word of honor,” bail, surety, and “pawn” provisions is unavailable, leaving “temporary detention in accordance with rules” as the option that the Court has exercised. However, whether the detention of the Yaran is indeed “temporary” or even “in accordance with rules” is open to serious question inviting open debate. In any event, the term “temporary detention” has been stretched beyond the limits. Any “temporary detention” that has lasted for over a year and a half stretches credulity and should shock the judicial conscience. (The defendant, Mrs. Mahvash Sabet, was arrested on March 5, 2008 in northeastern city of Mashhad, while the other six defendants, Mr. Behrouz Tavakkoli, Mr. Saeed Rezai’i, Mrs. Fariba Kamalabadi, Mr. Vahid Tizfahm, Mr. Jamaloddin Khanjani and Mr. Afif Na’imi, were arrested in their homes in Tehran on May 14, 2008.) Thus the Yaran have effectively been held under what may be analyzed as “compulsory detention.”

Thus, whether the Yaran continue to be held under “temporary” or de facto “compulsory” detention, under Iranian criminal procedure, “temporary detention” has its own “rules” — rules established under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Code of Criminal Procedure for the Courts of General Jurisdiction and Revolutionary Courts that outline the rights of detainees and set clear limits for what is permissible during arrest, interrogation, and detention.

Part II:
Temporary Detention, Access to Counsel

Detention is not about the length of incarceration alone. There are aspects of detention that must also be considered, such as whether the detainees have been properly treated or improperly mistreated. Among the kinds of maltreatment to which a detainee can be subjected are denial of access to counsel, denial of regular visits with family in accordance with prison regulations, denial of humane treatment in a variety of ways — especially when it comes to subjection to physical torture and psychological abuse — in clear violation of applicable provisions of international law. But, for the sake of developing what may be characterized as an “Iranian” or “ Shi’I Islamic” argument, this article narrowly focuses on treatment of the Yaran under Iranian criminal procedure, which is said to be predicated on Iranian Islamic law. Accordingly, the question of international law, and its application to the Yaran, will not be treated, except marginally, in this article. Previous publications, including those of the present writer, have provided ample documentation noting the various violations of international law to which the Iranian Baha’is, in general, and the Yaran, in particular, have been subjected.

Evidence suggests that some or all of the Yaran have been variously detained in solitary confinement. The record is quite clear that, with a single exception, the Yaran were denied access to counsel up until the time the first session of the trial, which took place on January 12, 2010. The Yaran, moreover, have been denied regular visits with their families, although visits have taken place on rare occasions. Further evidence can be produced to show that the Yaran were subjected to severe psychological and physical pressure to recant their belief in the Baha’i Faith.

The present writer has relied on several sources of information, including one important source: “‘You Can Detain Anyone for Anything’: Iran’s Broadening Clampdown on Independent Activism.” Human Rights Watch 20.1(E) (January 2008), available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/iran0108/iran0108web.pdf. Other sources will be cited throughout the remainder of this article.

Temporary Detention
Under the Iranian system, is there a distinction between lawful temporary detention and unlawful, arbitrary detention? How long may detainees remain in pretrial detention without formal charges? The answer, at first, appears deceptively simple and straightforward. Article 32 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran requires that “charges with the reasons for accusation must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial authorities within a maximum of 24 hours.” Consistent with the Constitution, Article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure likewise sets 24 hours as the limit within which authorities must provide a detainee with a written reason “in cases where the detainee must be kept in detention in order for authorities to continue their investigation.” This, a judge is required to authorize any pretrial detention and provide written charges within 24 hours of any arrest. These laws obviously were not applied to the Yaran. How is that possible?

There are many exceptions and loopholes under Iranian Islamic law. Article 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a judge may issue temporary detention orders for cases involving criminal offenses under Iran’s “Offenses Against the National and International Security of the Country” (“Security Laws”), allowing authorities to hold detainees beyond the 24-hour period, without charge:

Article 32 [Arrest]
No one may be arrested except by the order and in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. In case of arrest, charges with the reasons for accusation must, without delay, be communicated and explained to the accused in writing, and a provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial authorities within a maximum of twenty-four hours so that the preliminaries to the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible. The violation of this article will be liable to punishment in accordance with the law.

What recourse, if any, does the accused have under such circumstances? Article 33 of the CCP gives the accused the right to appeal his or her detention order within 10 days, and that the detainee’s case must be resolved in the course of one month. The exception to this rule is one that allows the judge to renew the temporary detention order, and there is no limit on how many times the judge may renew this order. It the case of the Yaran, the ongoing “investigation, which took over 18 months, effectively kept the Baha’i detainees under a perpetual “temporary” detention that would last until the state had completed its investigation. During this period, the Yaran have been held largely incommunicado during the pretrial investigation period, and were denied access to their attorneys during this period, except for one meeting in Evin Prison, and the authorities allowed but little communication with family members.

On October 17, 2009, Mr. Abdolfattah Soltani — spokesman for the Defenders of Human Rights Center (co-founded by 2003 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Shirin Ebadi) and one of the four attorneys representing the Yaran, was interviewed by the Committee of Human Rights Reporters. On the issue of improper detention, Mr. Soltani stated:

On 15 Shahrivar (September 6, 2009), I and other attorneys on this case objected to the temporary detention of these individuals. The deadline for the temporary detention had already expired, and the court did not have the legal right to extend the length of the temporary detention. The case was, therefore, sent to the appeals court to consider our objection. Cases of prisoners who are accused of a crime are usually considered within 4 to 5 days. But 40 days have passed since this case was sent to the appeals court, and we do not even know to which branch it has been sent. Our follow-up with the computer section [of the court] has been futile and they have not yet announced to us which branch is considering the case. (“Interview with human rights lawyer Soltani,” Iran Press Watch, October 22, 2009)

Here, Attorney Soltani, acting on behalf of the Yaran, has filed an appeal with an appellate court on the grounds that the lower Revolutionary Court exceeded its jurisdiction in extending, yet again, the length of temporary detention. This appeal illustrates the application of Iranian criminal procedure to the case of the Baha’i seven. Note that, in this legal action, Mr. Soltani has filed his appeal pursuant to the clear provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and not under the authority or procedures of international law. The basis for this appeal is clear: The Revolutionary Court, according to the appeal filed by the Defenders of Human Rights Center through Mr. Soltani, exceeded its own authority by violating procedural rules governing temporary detention under Iranian criminal law. The present writer does not presently know of the outcome or current status of this appeal, and it may well be that Mr. Soltani himself has not been so informed.

Access to Counsel
The right to counsel is protected under Iranian law as well as under international law. Article 35 of Iran’s Constitution guarantees the right to counsel:

Article 35 [Right to Counsel]
Both parties to a lawsuit have the right in all courts of law to select an attorney, and if they are unable to do so, arrangements must be made to provide them with legal counsel.

Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, effectively undermines this right. Article 128 provides that, during the investigative phase, counsel may be denied “in cases where the issue has a secretive aspect or the judge believes that the presence of anyone other than the accused may lead to corruption.” Although the investigative phase may last up to a month, a judge may renew the detention phase indefinitely. In crimes involving national security, “the presence of the lawyer during the investigative stage takes place with the permission of the court.” Article 128 grants the judge discretionary power to deny counsel during the investigative phase. In the case of the Yaran, the Baha’i seven were permitted to meet with their attorneys only once prior to the first session of the trial on January 12, 2010.

This protection, however, is of little avail unless upheld by the Iranian authorities, both in spirit as well as in letter. The Yaran, as previously mentioned, are represented by four lawyers from the Center for the Defense of Human Rights — Ms. Shirin Ebadi (Iran’s first female judge prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, and awarded the Nobel Peace prize in 2003), Mr. Abdolfattah Soltani, Mr. Hadi Esma’ilzadeh and Ms. Mahnaz Parakand. The latter two, Mr. Esma’ilzadeh and Ms. Parakand, took part in the hearing on January 12, 2010, as Ms. Ebadi is out of the country. Mr. Soltani was unavailable, have been twice imprisoned previously.

As noted earlier, the Yaran’s “representation” was unduly restrictive. Shortly after the trial, Ms. Ebadi commented: “When I and my colleagues accepted to act as their defense lawyers, they [detainees] had not been allowed to see their families for over a year. And for some time too, they were not allowed to meet with us. After a year and a half when the investigation ended, I and the rest of the lawyers were permitted to read the dossier and we met them on one occasion in prison.” (“Iran’s Ebadi says seven Baha’is must be acquitted.” Washington TV)

Although the application of international law to the case at bar is outside the purview of this article, brief mention will be made of applicable international standards. There are a number of applicable provisions of international law that may be brought to bear in the case of the Yaran. Two representative provisions will be provided here, for purposes of illustration: (1) The United Nations’ “Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers” provides, in relevant part: “All arrested, detained or imprisoned persons shall be provided with adequate opportunities, time and facilities to be visited by and communicate and consult with a lawyer, without delay, interception or censorship and in full confidentiality. Such consultations may be within sight, but not within hearing, of law enforcement officials.” (Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990), art. 8.) (2) Similarly, the United Nations’ Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners requires, in relevant part: “An untried prisoner shall be allowed to inform immediately his family of his detention and shall be given all reasonable facilities for communicating with his family and friends, and for receiving visits from them, subject only to restrictions and supervision as are necessary in the interests of the administration of justice and of the security and good order of the institution.” (Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted Aug. 30, 1955, by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/611, annex I, E.S.C. res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended E.S.C. res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977), Rule 92.) As the two foregoing provisions of international law demonstrate, Iranian authorities have clearly violated international standards regarding the treatment of detainees in denying the Baha’i seven immediate and adequate access to counsel, and denying regular family visits in accordance with prison regulations. In this respect, the Yaran have not received equal treatment with similarly situated detainees in Iran in general, although it could be argued that the Yaran have, indeed, have received equal mistreatment with similarly situated security detainees.

Strangely, international human rights law does not specify a maximum allowable period of detention before trial. Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) commands that “anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge … shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release may be subjected to guarantees to appear for trial.” However, the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) does set limits (i.e. Article 32 of Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure both set a limit of 24 hours within which formal charges, in writing, must be communicated to the accused), although security exceptions are commonly applied to circumvent requirements of Iranian law. However, the security exceptions in Article 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (and ensuing provisions allowing for judicial renewals of temporary detention orders of indefinite duration) stand in stark violation the ICCPR’s due process guarantees.

The present writer had originally intended to discuss the treatment of the Yaran inside Evin Prison, having had access to some personal narratives that provide important details as to their experience in prison. However, the author has chosen not to engage in this analysis because of the security risks to parties in Iran involved. Moreover, disclosure of such intimate details could have the unwelcome effect of subjecting the Yaran to even worse treatment. However, what has been made public is the following information:

Each one of them [the Yaran] is facing a particular physical hardship, while they are deprived of things as basic as having a bed to sleep on. (Ma‘man Rezaee, “For my Father,” Iran Press Watch (October 21, 2009).

Here, each of the Baha’i seven were denied so basic a necessity as a bed upon which to sleep. Moreover, each of the Yaran was subjected to unspecified instances of “physical hardship.” The reader is left to fill in the details, as it simply was not expedient for the daughter to reveal specific details regarding the physical deprivations that the Yaran have been made to endure.

Part III:
Application of “The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam” (CDHRI)

To be fair, “The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam” (CDHRI) — promulgated at the Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Cairo on 5 August 1990 — is a historic document that should command international respect. Certainly, each of the members of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, including Iran, which is a signatory, is bound by the terms of this declaration. Although no enforcement provisions have been incorporated, each member of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers stands accountable for its compliance, or noncompliance, with respect to each and every one of its provisions. In the present analysis, it makes sense to begin with Article 1, which provides:

Article 1
(a) All human beings form one family whose members are united by submission to God and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. True faith is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human perfection.
(b) All human beings are God’s subjects, and the most loved by him are those who are most useful to the rest of His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety and good deeds.

Here, note that respect for all human beings is the respective of “religious belief.” The problem is that Iran has taken every measure to ensure that the Baha’i Faith is not recognized as a religion. By excluding Iran’s largest non-Muslim religious minority — a community estimated to be 300,000 — from the category of a “recognized” religion, the Iranian regime has rendered Article 1 inapplicable to the Baha’is of Iran.

Even if another member Islamic state were to lodge a protest against Iran’s treatment of the Baha’is in general, and of the Yaran in particular (an unlikely event), Iran can easily appeal to the final provisions of the CDHRI, which state:

Article 24
All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari‘ah.

Article 25
The Islamic Shari‘ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles of this Declaration.

Here, the application of the Islamic law code (the “Shari‘ah”) can effectively nullify the application Article 1 to the to the Baha’is of Iran, and, indeed, application to the Baha’is of every member state of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, for the simple reason that Islam does not recognize even the possibility of a post-Islamic religion.

There are, however, other provisions that, although predicated on the application of Islamic law, may be invoked as “Islamic” protections that should be extended to the Baha’is of Iran and, instantly, to the Yaran:

Article 19
(a) All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between the ruler and the ruled.
(b) The right to resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone.
(c) Liability is, in essence, personal.
(d) There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided for in the Shari‘ah.
(e) A defendant is innocent until his guilt is proven in a fair trial in which he shall be given all the guarantees of defence.

Article 20
It is not permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to exile or to punish him. It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological torture or to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity. … Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would provide executive authority for such actions.

Here, Article 19(e), in principle, should be fully and evenhandedly applied to all individuals, irrespective of religious affiliation. Unfortunately, this Declaration offers no definition of what constitutes a “fair trial.” Nor does this Declaration provide any legal or diplomatic recourse for violations under any of its (presumably inviolable). provisions.

Article 20 prohibits any act of “physical or psychological torture or to any form of humiliation, cruelty or indignity.” Without divulging significant details that may pose a danger to the Yaran, suffice to say that evidence exists that the Yaran were subjected to privations, indignities, as well as physical and psychological abuse, some of which may well qualify as acts of “torture.”

Conclusion
The foregoing legal analysis of the case history and treatment of the Baha’i seven, known as the Yaran (“Friends”), has demonstrated clear violations of Iranian criminal law, as set forth and the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as previously cited), and egregious infringements of constitutional protections as enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One further example regards freedom of religion. In principle, but not in practice, the Iranian Constitution protects freedom of belief:

Article 23 [Freedom of Belief]
The investigation of individuals’ beliefs is forbidden, and no one may be molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain belief.

Of course, this constitutional protection has never been extended to the Baha’is of Iran. Instead, what has happened is quite the opposite: The full panoply of Iranian state apparatus has been extensively mobilized to conduct investigations of individuals’ Baha’i beliefs, and Baha’is have, in the very terms of Article 23, been regularly molested and taken to task simply for holding Baha’i beliefs.

Part IV:
The Right to a Defense

The Iranian State is using the instrumentality of the legal system to prosecute what may be fairly characterized as a “show trial” for the benefit of anti-Baha’i hardliners—yet to the great detriment of Iran’s international standing in the community of nations, as well as a betrayal of its own stated principles. Worst of all, the fair name of Islam—which stands for “submission” to the powerful presence of justice under divine precept and praxis—will be tarnished if this travesty of pretextual espionage, and other security charges, is allowed to go forward.

On procedural grounds alone, the Revolutionary Court should dismiss this case, with prejudice, for lack of due process. As a signatory of the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Due, Iran has committed itself, under international law, to the exercise of due process. Due process, however, is absent from this case.

Even if Iran were to openly repudiate international law (instead of maintaining the pretense of abiding by it, albeit on its own terms and subject to its own legal interpretations), Iran cannot escape the charge of violating its own procedural requirements.

The closed trial of the Yaran, moreover, has put Iranian Islam on open trial. This charade of justice promises to be a spectacle of debacle, a travesty of due process, a perversion of Iranian “Islamic” justice, a flagrant repudiation of universal standards of human rights, a shock to the judicial conscience, an affront to human dignity, an international scandal and a national disgrace. This high-profile, show trial will backfire.

The Iranian authorities should take into consideration the ramifications of this trial should it produce an unjust result. The international community, according to Article 3 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, is duty-bound to roundly condemn such actions, and to make compliance with this requirement of international law a precondition to normalized diplomatic relations. The “world court” of international public opinion will render its verdict, either way, depending on the outcome of this widely publicized and highly symbolic case. If the Yaran are declared guilty and are sentenced, Iran will be roundly declared as having violated international law (and, arguably, Iranian criminal procedure) and pronounced “guilty”, and sentenced to further isolation by the international community.

In the final analysis, Iran’s anti-Baha’i policy does serious damage to the reputation of Islam globally, not only to the Shi’i Islam of Iran, but also to the Sunni Islam of most other Islamic countries. As a consequence of Iran’s treatment of its Baha’i minority — and especially of the Yaran — the ultimate injury-in-fact is refractory damage to the reputation of Islam in the eyes of the international community. As Mr. Soltani has stated in his October 17, 2009 interview: “Therefore, given international conditions, as well as the domestic situation in Iran, keeping the Baha’i leaders in prison is nothing but a [political] cost for the authorities. This is especially true because these individuals were not politically active, and do not represent a political front. They were only active within the realm of their beliefs.” And furthermore: “No physical evidence exists for any of the seven individuals on the charge brought against them. The charges are only in terms of generalities and, like many political and religious cases, contain no legal reasoning at all.” (“Interview with human rights lawyer Soltani,” Iran Press Watch (October 22, 2009).

Taking the charitable view that the State’s case here may be the result of invincible ignorance, dismissing the case against the Yaran on procedural grounds alone would be the best way for all parties to “save face.” This way, the Iranian state will not have to meet its burden to “prove” its baseless accusations, as the merits of the case will no longer have to be reached. This, I submit, would be the most expedient way for the Court to extricate itself from the procedural objections which, on appeal, would predictably go before the Supreme Court of Iran for judicial review.

The sentencing trial of the Yaran is now set for February 7, 2010. This trial will test legislation passed less than six years earlier. On May 2, 2004, the “Law of Protection of Citizens” was passed by former President Mohammad Khatami and the Sixth Parliament of Iran. It was accepted by the Council of Guardians the next day. Article 3 obliges the court to observe the right of the accused to offer a defense, and the court’s duty to provide the accused with the opportunity to obtain an attorney and an expert. Although Article 3 of the Law of Protection of Citizens has removed the limitations imposed by Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the courts have reportedly not implemented Article 3 of the Law of Protection of Citizens. See “Rights of Detainees and Accused in the Legal System of Islamic Republic of Iran,” by Navid R. Sato, Esq. See also Silvia Tellenbach, “Aspects of the Iranian Code of Islamic Punishment: The Principle of Legality and the Temporal, Spatial and Personal Applicability of the Law.” International Criminal Law Review 9 (2009): 689–705.

According to Judge Stefan Trechsel, Duty Judge of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), at The Hague in The Netherlands, criminal proceedings must comport with two fundamental principles of justice: procedural and substantive. Procedural due process, under a defined code of criminal procedure, must uphold the right to a fair trial. Fair trial guarantees include the right to a public hearing, the right to be tried within a reasonable time, the right to be heard before an impartial and independent and tribunal, the right of the accused to be presumed innocent—until such time as the prosecution can prove culpability beyond a reasonable doubt—and the right to an appeal under judicial review. There must be an equipotent “equality of arms” between the prosecution and defense. The right to a fair and open trial protects the defendant from secret trials. Trials must be fair in order to succeed in their “presentation of justice” and thus inspire confidence in the administration of justice. A fair trial is not only for the accused; it also protects the right of the public (including the international community) to scrutinize the integrity of proceedings. It confirms or denies the legitimacy of State authority to its own people and to the world. See “Report: Workshop: Procedural Justice—Comparative Aspects, 1st December 2007”

Is an “Iranian fair trial” an oxymoron? The Yaran’s access to fundamental fair trial rights is a key indicator of equitability in the Iranian system of criminal justice. Iran’s criminal justice system will lose its integrity and credibility if due process standards are not applied in this high-profile show trial. Unless and until the Yaran are tried for internationally recognizable criminal offenses in proceedings that meet internationally recognized fair trial standards, the Iranian criminal justice system will lose face—indeed, will be shamefaced—in the court of international opinion.

APPENDIX:
CHECKLIST OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
UNDER IRAN’S CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The manner in which the Yaran were treated violated the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran’s Code of Criminal Procedure, and international standards of due process.

To consult the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure, see Qanun-i A’yin-i Dadrisiyih Dadgahhayih Umumi va Inqilab dar Umur-i Kayfari [Criminal Procedure Code for Public and Revolutionary Courts] (1379) [2001], online at http://hoghoogh.online.fr/article.php3?id_article=67 (in Persian).

See also the Qanun-i Ihtiram bih Azadihayih Mashru’ va Hifz-i Huquq-i Shahrvandi (“Law Respecting Legitimate Freedoms and Protecting Citizen Rights” or “Citizen Rights Law”) 1383 [2004], online at http://www.bia-judiciary.ir/tabid/144/Default.aspx (in Persian).

The following provisions from the Iranian Code of Criminal Procedure provide a checklist by which the Iranian judiciary’s compliance with its own national (and Islamic) standards, as applied to the Yaran’s due process rights, may be measured.

1. Article 112: “The accused shall be summoned by an arrest warrant. There should be two copies of the arrest warrant; one is served to the accused and the other must be signed by the accused and handed back to the serving officer.”
2. Article 119: “The accused shall be summoned by an arrest warrant. The arrest warrant, which contains the reasons for the summons, must be read to the accused.”
3. Article 121: “The accused should be summoned during the day, except in case of an emergency.”
4. Article 123: “The accused shall be accompanied and monitored from the time of summoning to the time he or she is presented to a judge.

Comment: The officers are responsible for presenting the summoned person immediately to a judge. The accused may only be detained if there is the possibility of flight or the destruction of evidence; in the absence of these two conditions, officers do not have the right to detain an individual for more than 24 hours.”

5. Article 132: “For the purpose of having access to the accused and his due appearance before the court when necessary, and to avoid absconding or hiding or interfering with others, the judge, after explaining the charge to the accused, shall use one of the following guarantees: (1) Obligation under the word of honor to appear before the court; (2) Obligation under bail to appear before the court until the trial has finished and the judgment has been enforced. In case of non-appearance, this shall be converted to surety; (3) Surety; (4) Pawn, including a sum of money or bank guarantee or real or personal property; (5) Temporary detention in accordance with rules.”
6. Article 185: “All parties to a criminal dispute have the right to select and introduce their own legal counsel(s) to a court of law. The date and the time of the court appearance will be announced to the accused, plaintiffs, defendants and their attorneys. If the disputing parties have multiple lawyers, the presence of one lawyer from each side is sufficient for the court to proceed.”

By Dr. Majid Naficy

Recently, a letter was published over the signature of 42 Iranian intellectuals addressed to the Baha’i community and proclaiming “one and a half century of persecution and our silence is enough”.  The title of the letter was We are Ashamed.

Over a month ago, Mr. Khosro Shemiranie sent this letter to me to sign.  Even though from the age of fourteen I have been saddened by what Baha’is have been going through and I have written about it, I responded that I could not sign it since it was instigated by a “feeling of shame” and “collective sin” and not “seeking justice and freedom of conscience”.  I added, “If you reword this letter in which the phrase ‘We are Ashamed’ is repeated thirteen times and change it to ‘We arise to defend the rights of Baha’is’, you can be sure that I will sign it without any hesitation.”

Now that this open letter has been published and broadly disseminated, and many others have joined as signatories, I find it necessary to write my reasons for not signing it.  I hope by launching this discussion, I can bring to light the tyranny and persecutions to which Baha’is have been subjected during the rule of the three regimes of Qajar, Pahlavi and Khomeini over the past 160 years.

1. My First Encounter with Baha’is

The first time I got to know a Baha’i was in Sa’di High School in Isfahan, when I was in the seventh grade.  His name was Golestan Mossafaei, and he was in the eleventh grade.  I met him at our school’s Literature Club.  The club was managed by Mohammad Hoquqi, our teacher and resident poet.  This club did not last long; it shut down under the pressure imposed by prejudiced school officials.

Golestan always had a sweet smile, and sometimes he composed poems.  A few times I went to his house, which was located close to a stream in Darvazeh Hasanabad.  It was a modest house with one room. Even that room was barely furnished.  Golestan explained how their house had been set on fire a few times, by an anti-Baha’i group called Hojjatiyeh.

Flyers had also been thrown into their yard, pressuring them to leave their residence.

I felt deeply sad hearing about the tyranny inflicted on Golestan and his family.

I wrote a short story about it, and read it to members of my literary circle “Jong-e Isfahan”.

The vice principal of the school was furious about my friendship with Golestan, and told my father that Majid had been entrapped by Baha’is.  My father gave me a worn-out booklet called “Memoires of Prince Dolgoruki”, the Russian Ambassador in Iran from 1846-1854, who allegedly claimed that the Baha’i movement had been started by Russians in order to destroy Iran and the Shiah sect of Islam.  My mother forbade me from having a friendship with Golestan Mossafaei.  She made such a monster of Golestan that whenever my four year old sister was mad at me, she would say, “Get lost Mofassaaei”.

School teachers collaborated in pressuring me, and failed me in “calligraphy” when I was in grade 7!  I was a bright student who had passed grade six with an average above 90.  In the eighth grade, I was given failing grades in “calligraphy”, “religion”, “algebra” and “geometry”, and had to retake the exams for these subjects at the end of summer. I was not given passing grades and had to repeat grade 8 the following year.  This was the first big failure of my life, and taught me a lesson in resilience.  I left day school, and enrolled in a night school so that I would be able to complete two grades in one year.

Sa’di High School was run by a religious mafia, composed of a few teachers and a fanatically religious vice principal.  At the top of the group, there was a physics teacher whose name was Nuri and looked like a shopkeeper in the old bazaar.  His shirts were buttoned up to the chin, and his face was always unshaven.  He was the one who shut down our literature club, with the excuse that the organizer of the club disseminated the atheistic views of the prominent novelist, Sadeq Hedayat (1903-51), and caused students to drift away from Islam.  Two mullahs by the names of Rohani and Faqih-Imami were our “religion” teachers.  Another Mullah named Fazaeli, with good penmanship, taught us calligraphy. Even though he had a close relationship with the Shah’s appointed rulers in Isfahan, he also had close ties with our school religious mafia.[1]

After two years of studying at night school, I enrolled in another high school called Harati. That school was not free of staunch religious, fanatical teachers either.

I remember on cold winter days, as we heard the school bell ring, we had to stand still on the spot and listen to Mr. Parvaresh.  After the revolution when he was appointed a Minister, we found out that he had been a member of an anti-Baha’i group [Hojjatieh Society -- see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hojjatieh].  He would sprinkle his religious speech with aphorism from Imam Ali in three languages, English, Arabic and Persian, showing off his talent!

2. Shaykhis and Mullahs

About the same time, impressed by the book Tat Neshinha-ye Boluk Zahra [The Tat People of the Zahra County] written by Jalal Al-Ahmad (1923-69), I became interested in the rural life of Iran and in traveling to a small village called Jandaq situated on the edge of Dasht- Namak desert.  Inhabitants of this village told me that they were followers of a sect called Shaykhi Baqiri.  This enticed me to started reading Shaykhi books.  I realized that the teachings of Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa’i (1753-1826) and his successor, Siyyid Kazim Rashti (1793-1843) had been instrumental for the appearance of Ali-Muhammad the Bab (1819-50) [co-founder of the Baha'i Faith].

After the death of Siyyid Kazim Rashti, one of the Qajar Princes, Aqa Karim Khan Kermani (1810-1871) became the Shaykhi leader.  In order to stop his followers from accepting the Bab, he turned into the most active anti-Babi mullah of his time.

Shaykhis grew in number and influence under him and his heir’s leadership.  Even Mozaffari’d-Din Shah considered himself a Shaykhi.

After Karim Khan Kermani, the Shaykhi school of thought was divided into two branches.

One branch that was in the majority considered Karim Khan’s son as their leader and the Fourth Pillar (that is, the intermediary between the Hidden Imam and his followers, which is similar to Khomeini’s idea of Velayet-e Faqih, “rule by jurists”).  The other branch, under the leadership of Mohammad-Baqir Hamadani, rejected the heredity nature of the Fourth Pillar.  They became known as Shaykhi Baqiris.

After studying Shaykhi books, I concluded that some of Shaykh Ahmad’s views seemed more logical than the views of his Shiah counterparts.  For example, resurrection at the Day of Judgment (known as Hurqalya) was the resurrection in a softer and more refined form– not a physical reconstruction.  I found the Babi movement attractive only to the extent that it was egalitarian and the fact that a courageous female poet by the name of Tahirih Zarrin-Taj (1814 or 1817-1852) was one of its prominent followers.  Other than that, from a young age, I was not interested in religious ideology.

My paternal grandfather, Abu-Torab, who had left the city of Kerman to settle in Pudeh, a small village near Isfahan, did not accept the heredity branch of the Shaykhis.  Going through my father’s library, I came across a few manuscripts of his grandfather, and once briefly read through one which explored the philosophical issue of free will versus predestination.

My father believed that there were no differences between Shaykhi and currently practiced Shiah schools, and that it was just a matter of whom each group considered to be their Source of Emulation.  However, I had the feeling that my parents were afraid of becoming known as Shaykhis and kept secret their meetings for the purpose of studying and discussing the books of Kermani and Hamadani.

Among the views of Shaykhi Baqiris, my father liked their distrust of traditional mullahs. Among contemporary Islamic thinkers, my father liked Ali Shariati (1933-77), an Iranian scholar who was against the cast of clergy.  I remember my father, while driving for picnics on Fridays, used to sing a folk song making fun of mullahs:

“I am a mullah, a mullah / Stayed overnight in a stable / A flea came and bit me / I kicked my quilt off/ Burnt my cot / And broke my teaspoon / I am a mullah, a mullah / Stayed overnight in a stable”.

In Iranian folktales, a mullah was often pictured as a “cunning fox”, and as a creature obsessed with food, overeating and sexual excesses, while pretending to be pious and self righteous.  Khomeini was well aware of how mullahs were portrayed and their reputation.  After the revolution, imitating his teacher, Abdul-Karim Haeri-Yazdi, Khomeini, in one of his speeches, changed the famous proverb “How easy to become a mullah, how hard to become a human!” to “How hard to become a mullah, impossible to become a human”.  He was trying to influence the subconscious of the masses and to overcome their innate sense of mistrust and resentment towards the mullahs.

3. From Tahirih to Ezzat

From 1964 to 1981, occasionally I came upon or heard about Baha’is.  For example, I heard about Bahram Sadeqi (1936-86), a renowned storywriter from Najafabad who was a Baha’i.

However, it was on September 17, 1981, when I found myself again in a situation in which I felt that I had the same destiny as Baha’is.

It was over two years since the revolution in Iran.  Fundamentalist militant rulers were violently persecuting and executing members of the Iranian National Front and the leftist organizations.  These groups were the ones that had played a crucial role in uprooting the Pahlavi regime.

On September 16, my wife and comrade, Ezzat Tabaian, left the house.  That night, she phoned a friend and hurriedly told him that while being chased by the Islamic Militia, she had fallen and broken her pelvic bone.  My wife asked him to contact me and tell me to quickly destroy all “incriminating evidence” in the house.  The next day, the same friend asked if I had a safe place to spend the night, knowing that our home would not be spared from attacks.  When I replied that I had nowhere to go, he suggested a large house on Lashkar square that belonged to his old aunt.

I knew his aunt was a Baha’i, and her house would not be a safe place either.  However, we had no choice but to go to his aunt’s house.  A deft servant opened the door and led us in.  The old aunt told us how Islamic forces had arrested the last members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Tehran.  She was worried about her own safety as well.

That night, I had the strange feeling that Tahirih, the courageous Babi female poet was talking to me from the edge of the well into which she had been thrown after being strangled, 150 years before.  I was seeing a connection between Tahirih and the painful fate of my wife in the claws of her tormentors.  A few years later on September 18, 1986, I wrote a poem, Raftam Golat Bechinam [I Went to Find your Flower] published in a collection of poems under the same title, about the events of three days after the arrest of my wife Ezzat. The second part of the poem relates to the old Baha’i woman who offered me her home as refuge:

I have hardly fled

The slaughter place of a Marxist

To take refuge in a Baha’i’s.

Is there a lesson here for me?

In the deserted courtyard

Where the yellow leaves rustle

And the lonely goldfish

Circles in the green water,

A secret is revealed to me:

The bloody body of Zarrin Taj is still

Hanging over the prison’s well.

- Have you seen my Isaac?

The old building echoes my words.

“Ezzat”s and “Tahirih”s had the same destiny.  On January 7, 1982, Ezzat and another leftist woman, along with fifty leftist men, faced the firing squad.  Their bodies were dumped in the Khavaran cemetery located southeast of Tehran.  Two months before that, I had gone to the same cemetery with my wife to visit the grave of a relative, Sadeq Okhovat, who had faced the firing squad.  At that time, there were perhaps fewer than 30 graves at Khavaran.  The second visit was for my wife, and I was accompanied by my brother-in-law, Hosein Okhovat-Moqadam.  However, when Hosein was executed a few weeks later, I could not bring myself to visit the Khavaran cemetery again.

Later I learned that three days before my wife was executed — that is, on January 4, 1982 — six members of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Tehran had been executed and their bodies had been dumped in the same cemetery.

On January 2009, this cemetery was demolished by the Islamic Government of Iran.

It was the resting place of 50 Baha’is, and thousands of other freedom-seeking Iranians.

4. The Test of the Broadmindedness of Iranians

I know about the sufferings endured by Baha’is not only from books, but also from seeing it first hand in my own day-to-day life.  Their sufferings date back to the time of the Shah of Iran, particularly in the 1950s, when with the Shah’s approval and using the national radio, Mohammad-Taqi Falsafi would deliver blistering sermons which provoked mobs to attack Baha’i holy places.

This trend has continued under the present reign of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been governing for the past 30 years, and has executed over 200 Baha’is solely on the ground that they were Baha’is.  Baha’is do not have the slightest basic human or civil rights as Iranian citizens.  In an article which I wrote in 2004 titled “Shirin Ebadi and Freedom of Conscience”, I recognized:

Defending the Baha’is must be considered a litmus test for any intellectual Iranian claiming that they honor human rights. In the Islamic government of Iran, there is no place for any Baha’i, Buddhist, Hindu, atheist, or the like. This is because according to Article 13 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the only recognized religious minorities are Zoroastrian, Jewish, or Christian Iranians.

Among the many minority groups that are legally deprived of their right to freedom of conscience, the situation of the Baha’is has been in particular the bleakest.

From the inception of this religion, dating back to the era of Mohammad Shah Qajar, the Iranian Shiah clergy have been leading open attacks on this community [i.e. Babis and Baha’is].  The clergy imagined that the appearance of the Bab robbed them of their messianic claim to the expected Hidden Imam, Who is suppose to appear at the “end of time” to fill the world with justice.  They believe that the appearance of the Bab took away from them the raison d’etre of Shi’ism.

During the final decade of the Shah’s regime, rumors began to be spread by fanatical groups known for their anti-Baha’i stance, aimed at provoking the people with mentally-sick hatred against the Baha’is, that Baha’is were supporters of the Shah.  These false rumors became so widespread that even after the 1979 revolution, when in 1981 the regime began to intensely suppress the opposition including the Baha’is, Iranian intellectuals hesitated to defend the Baha’is against oppression – even when they could see perfectly well that Baha’is were being imprisoned, tortured, and executed merely for being Baha’i.  It is for this reason that I consider the single most important quality of a democratic-minded Iranian is to be a supporter of the right of Baha’is to their religion and not heed the fictitious excuse that “Baha’is are members of a political party and not a true religion”.

5. The Test of the Broadmindedness of Baha’is

After the publication of my article on Shirin Ebadi and the freedom of consciousness referred to above, I was asked: if the test of broadmindedness of an Iranian is in his defense of the rights of Baha’is, then what defines the broadmindedness of a Baha’i?

In my opinion, a democratic Iranian Baha’i must not only defend the rights of all heterodox thinkers in Iran, but must first and foremost defend the rights of the followers of Azal who call themselves by the name Bayani.  Only then can a Baha’i be worthy of the title of free and democratic.

To make this matter more clear, I will explain something that happened in 1987 in Los Angeles.  I was invited to a poetry night, and recited the poem raftam golat bechinam, from which a stanza was quoted above.  Among the attendees was a Baha’i couple.  At that time, in this poem I had used the word Babi instead of Baha’i.  Afterwards, the Baha’i woman asked, “Why did you use the word Babi?  Today there are no Babis and they all have become Baha’is.”

Her question and comment not only demonstrated the narrow-mindedness and exclusivity of some Baha’is towards the minority group of the Babi-Azalis, but it also illustrates the narrow-mindedness of many Iranian leftists, of which I had been one, as well.

At this point is it necessary to briefly look at the history of the emergence of the Babi movement and the divisions that took place within it.

6. The Azalis and the Baha’is

At the age of 24, Ali-Muhammad Shirazi in 1844 declared himself to be the Bab, which means he was the gate to the Promised One of Shia Islam.  He later confirmed that indeed He was the Promised One himself.  Shortly before His execution in 1850 in Tabriz, He named one of His followers, a 14-year-old youth named Mirza Yahya Nuri, to be His successor and gave him the title Subh-i Azal.[2]

After the premiership of Amir Kabir, efforts to eradicate the Babis increased in intensity and many of them were compelled to leave their native land.  In 1863, Mirza Husayn-Ali, known as Baha’u’llah, declared himself to be “He Whom God Shall Make Manifest”, Whose appearance was foretold by the Bab.  Baha’u’llah was a step-brother of Mirza Yahya (Subh-i Azal) and was 13 years his senior.  At the time, both brothers lived in Edirne, a town in the Ottoman Empire.

Mirza Yahya did not accept his brother’s claim and the differences between the two caused enmity and bloodshed among the Babis.  Eventually, in order to alleviate the situation, the Ottoman government was forced to exile Yahya to Cyprus and Baha’u’llah to Palestine.

Edward Browne (1862-1929), an English scholar who visited both brothers, writes about this bloodshed which resembles the enmity between Shiah and Sunni in Islam or Trotsky and Stalin at the time of Bolshevism.[3]

The followers of Baha’u’llah proclaimed their mission to be for the entire world and quickly grew in numbers. However, the followers of the younger brother [Mirza Yahya], returned to or stayed in Iran to fight against the political system and to reduce the influence of the Qajar dynasty.  Two of Mirza Yahya’s sons-in-Law, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi, emerged at the forefront of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-11).

They gave their life in this path in Tabriz.  During the 1909 interval in which the Iranian Constitution was suspended, the successor of Mirza Yahya by the name of Yahya Dawlatabadi was collaborating with the prominent writer Ali-Akbar Dehkhoda (1879-1959) to publish the freedom-fighting newspaper Sorush in Istanbul.

Today, Azalis who continue to call themselves Bayani, that is, followers of the book of the Bayan written by the Bab, are a small minority community in Iran.  Because of their practice of dissimulation, they hide their beliefs.  By contrast, the followers of Baha’u’llah have their center in Haifa, have worldwide recognition and number several million.

7. The Dualistic Approach of the Leftist Movement

During the 1970s, leftist intellectuals in Iran revisited the Bab’s movement and grew attracted to it as a social uprising against feudalism — they also acknowledged the contributions of Azali thinkers during the Constitutional Revolution.[4]  However, as Iranian Marxists on one hand did not respect the necessary role of freedom of conscience, and on the other hand believed the fictitious rumors about Baha’i collaboration with the government during the premiership of Amir-Abbas Hoveyda (and the evidence they had in this regard was that the notorious Parviz Sabeti ran the SAVAK’s televised shows), they had a negative view of the Baha’is.  This negative attitude increased, particularly after the revolution.

The Soviet-oriented Tudeh party, which considered itself a main backer of the Islamic regime, started helping the fundamentalist clergy in their anti-Baha’i activities.  As written by Reza Fani-Yazdi, “Suddenly, in spring 1982, the Tudeh party sent a circular letter to all its regional offices throughout the country instructing that all Baha’is were to be expelled from its membership rolls.”[5]

The members of the Tudeh party were asked not only to expel the Baha’is, but also to divulge the identity of any members of the independent leftist groups who were anti-regime.  Though the Tudeh party had played an important role in creating the new Islamic regime, it was not long after the revolution that they fell prey to the oppressive regime they had helped build.

On February 11, 1981, an independent Marxist and anti-establishment group, Peykar Organization had arranged a demonstration in Tehran’s Enqelab Square to mark the anniversary of the anti-Shah revolution.  There I was identified by two medical students supporters of the Tudeh Party) with whom I had used to go hiking at the time of the Shah.  The Islamic security guards had turned Capri, a movie theatre into a centre for interrogating demonstrators.  They seized me, and were dragging me to the interrogation center when I managed to escape with the help of a few friends who started fighting with the vigilante.  (Two of my rescuers are still alive and live in North California.)  When I made it home, I found my wife Ezzat very worried; she had seen me captured, but had not seen my escape.  Alas, only a few months later it was I who had to witness my wife leaving home and never coming back.

8. Appeal for Justice not Collective Shame

With 300,000 followers in Iran, the Baha’i community is the largest minority group after the Sunni sect of Islam.  Nevertheless, Baha’is are deprived of all basic human and civil rights, including the freedom of belief, access to higher education, and employment in any government sector.

In a secret memorandum issued in 1991 and signed by the leader, Khamenei and President Rafsanjani, the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council instructed all its lower bodies regarding the principle policy of the government towards Baha’is: “prevention of their progress and advancement” at all levels of society.[6]  This was also the policy of Khomeini before and after the revolution.  While residing in Paris in the summer of 1978, Khomeini was interviewed by James Cockrof, a professor at Rutgers University. Khomeini was asked about his stance regarding the Baha’is and whether they would enjoy freedom of belief and action in an Islamic regime. Instead of a direct response, Khomeini stated, “Baha’ism is not a religion.  It is a political party and a misguided sect”. The interviewer again asked if Baha’is would be allowed to practice their religious duties. Khomeini responded, “No”.[7]

In Khomeini’s terse responses, one can find two justifications for the Shiah fundamentalist’s suppression of the Baha’is.  The first justification is that the Baha’i faith is not a religion, but a political party associated with the government of the Shah and colonialism, and which gives support to Israel.  Therefore, the Baha’is should be suppressed for the sake of the country’s security.  The second justification is that the Baha’is are condemned for apostasy.  According to Article 5 of the Criminal Code regarding the “law of apostasy” presented to the Islamic Parliament in February 2008, apostates (which includes the Baha’is) will be sentenced to death if they are male, and life imprisonment if they are female.

The first justification mentioned above is based on collective punishment. That is, if a member of a group is alleged to have committed a crime, then all members of that group, whether male, female, elderly, or child, are guilty through association, and will be subject to punishment.  The second justification is based on sheer disregard for human rights, freedom of belief and of the right to choose a religion or no religion.

This justification has its roots in the obscurantism of the middle ages.

In both the above justifications, the right and individual responsibility is completely absent, and instead emphasis is placed on collective belief and group ideologies.

In contradistinction to the above, if we were to accept the principle that all humans, regardless of gender, religion, ethnicity, social status and religious belief, are equal before the law and that they have natural rights to freedom of belief, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and such natural liberties, then the above two justifications for oppressing Baha’is and other minorities will have no foundation whatsoever.  Therefore, it is necessary to recognize individual freedom in the country’s Constitution in order to open the door of justice to all Baha’is and other minorities.

This appeal for justice has two inseparable parts:

1. Complete alignment of the country’s Constitution with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations, which calls for the separation of religion and state

2. Activities of the anti-Baha’i group Hojjatiyeh should be considered illegal and forced to end. All those who have been involved in the persecution of Baha’is and other minorities should be brought to justice in a court of law, in the presence of a jury and defense attorneys.

As I mentioned in the beginning of this essay, the greatest shortcoming of the open letter to the Baha’i community of Iran titled “We are Ashamed” is that instead of demanding justice for the Baha’is (that is, insisting that freedom of belief must be enshrined in the Constitution and that anti-Baha’i groups be made illegal), it proposed a collective shame upon all Iranian intellectuals for allowing 150 years of oppression against the Baha’is.  Instead of calling on people to accept human rights, this open letter has established its foundation on collective shame and group repentance.

Without a doubt, when it comes to human and civil rights, the Baha’is of Iran are the most deprived.  As I have mentioned earlier, the test of Iranian broadmindedness must be measured by his sensitivity to the cruelty perpetrated against this group of our countrymen.

However, first, it is incorrect to accuse all intellectuals of “silence against crimes perpetrated against the Baha’is”.  Each person is responsible for his own actions and not for the oversights of others, whether in the past or at the present.  Second, feeling ashamed or guilty for wrongdoings committed in the past is a personal matter and should be sincerely communicated directly to the individuals or families adversely affected by the acts of oppression.  As I wrote in my July 2006 essay titled “Behazin and right of silence” published in “Shahrvand” magazine, I clearly explained that asking individuals to feel ashamed or to repent publicly for their beliefs is an old method of religious inquisition, dating back to the reigns of dictators such as Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Khomeini.

The main objective of such practices is to undermine and destroy the individual’s self-worth.

A liberated and broadminded intellectual would instead defend the rights of individuals, and would not allow public pressure to curtail individual beliefs and actions.  They would insist on personal responsibility and choice.

Public shaming and public confession is a method used by Franciscan monks in their inquisition period and employed in fanatical environments for the purpose of extracting acknowledgment and breaking down personal will.  In a similar manner, party administrators in the Stalinist era or under Mao’s regime employed “self-critical sessions” which used such techniques, and Khomeini used them in his televised public “confessions”, or for compulsory group meetings in Evin prison.

I say no to the so-called “original sin” of a group.  I say no to metaphoric “baptism” by signing a letter that confesses to shame.  We must fight for the freedom of belief and demand that anti-Baha’i activities be banned in Iran.  Let everyone tell their own personal stories, and if one feels ashamed about keeping silent while crimes were committed, let him or her take personal responsibility and deal with it as he or she sees fit.

20 February 2009

Notes

1. In September 2000 I published my memoir of this period in a detailed essay “avalin-haye man” (My Firsts) in Shahrvand magazine.  This essay has also been included in my book “man khod iran hastam va si-o-panj maqaleh-ye digar” (I am Iran Alone and Thirty-Five other Essays Toronto, Afra-Pegah publishers 2006

2. Dr. Naficy is mistaken in this regard.  While the Bab consented to Baha’u’llah’s request for Mirza Yahya to be named a temporary head of the community, there is no evidence whatsoever that Mirza Yahya was named a successor. The title Subh Azal was not given by the Bab and was self-adopted by Mirza Yahya Nuri. [Translator]

3. For an example of this discussion, refer to Edward Granville Browne, A Year Amongst the Persians, Cambridge University Press, 1927, pp. 559-62.  In that book, Browne refers to the killing of seven Azalis in Akka by the followers of Baha’u’llah.

4. For instance, see Mohammad-Reza Feshahi, Vapasin Junbesh Qurun Vusta’i: Akhbari, Usuli, Shaykhi and the Babi. Javidan Publications, Tehran, 1977.

5. Reza Fani-Yazdi, “Baha’i-setizi Pish va Pas az Enqelab” [Anti-Baha’ism before and after the Revolution”, Iran-Emrooz, 6/11/2008.

6. This document was uncovered by Reynaldo Pohl, the United Nations’ special representative on human rights in Iran, and published by him in his report of 1993: http://bic.org/assets/Pohl%20Iran%20report%20E.CN4.1993.41.pdf.  The passage related to the instructions issued after a joint meeting of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, President of Iran, and the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council is on p. 55, paragraph 310. [Translator]

7. See The Denial of Higher Education to the Baha’is of Iran, by Geoffrey Cameron.

[The Persian version of this essay was first published on Thursday, March 12, 2009, at http://fa.shahrvand.com/2008-07-14-20-49-09/2008-07-14-20-49-46/2284-2009-03-12-17-58-08.  Translation by Iran Press Watch and Dr. Majid Naficy.]

By Aram Anahid

Thirty years of theocratic rule has had a profound effect on Iranian religiosity. During the late 1970s, Iranians, who have long drawn upon their deep religious heritage to achieve a sense of identity, united behind their religious leaders to overthrow the Pahlavi dynasty and unanimously vote for the installation of an Islamic republic in its stead. While it is now generally accepted that few had any idea of what the Islamic Republic that Ayatollah Khomeini had endorsed was supposed to look like, the general impression at the time was that Iran’s Shi’ite clergy were destined to create a uniquely Islamic democracy – one which was rooted in Islam’s liberating principles and values rather than Western ideas and thoughts.

In effect, the Islamic Republic of Iran turned out to be a system that is invested with democratically elected legislative and executive institutions, yet restrained by a set of councils and assemblies which are generally populated by clerics with close ties to the country’s Supreme Leader, and which supposedly act to protect the very “Islamic values” that the nation once arose to uphold. While these latter institutions, too, are at least to some extent either directly or indirectly elected by popular vote (for example, even the Supreme Leader is chosen, and can be removed, by an Assembly of Experts whose members are, in turn, elected by adult suffrage), an increasing number of Iranians have come to regard their structures and functions, at best, as undemocratic, and, at worst, as oppressive.

It is, thus, not surprising that a Gallup survey conducted during the years 2005 and 2006 indicated that only 12 percent of Iranians are now willing to put legislation directly in the hands of religious leaders, while another 26 percent think that religious leaders should only act as advisors to legislative bodies, and a majority of 56 percent believe that they should have no role at all in legislation.[1]  This is despite indications that most Iranians are still deeply religious. In fact, a 2007 Gallup survey concluded that while today only 14% of Iranians believe that Islam’s principles, values, and ethics should act as the only source of legislation, a majority of 63% still want these values and principles to be a source of legislation, but not the only source.[2]

The above survey indicates that Iranians still want their Islamic values and principles to have at least some influence on legislation. Their ideal mechanism of this proposed influence, however, has clearly changed. Not long ago Iranians regarded their religious clergy as expert Islamic jurists – the very best men to turn to in matters of Islamic law and justice. The general understanding used to be that as laymen who had no extensive understanding of Islamic law, the members of the Shi’ite community had to accept the decrees of their scholars of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) in matters of Islamic jurisprudence. Now, however, most seem unwilling to endorse their Fuqaha (scholars of jurisprudence) and Mujtahidin (scholars of Islamic judgment) as legislators. This suggests that not many Iranians now see the decrees of these religious leaders as representative of true Islam. This may be, to a great extent, due to the fact that Iranians have largely reconsidered their mode of religiosity.

A research conducted by Abdolmohammad Kazemipur and Ali Rezaei concludes that between 1975 and 2001 Iranians dramatically shifted from organized to personalized religion and from a practice-centered mode of religiosity to a belief-centered one.[3]  For a country whose people arose, during the late 1970s, to uphold Islam as the foundation of their collective identity and the basis of their system of government, this amounts to nothing less than a complete U-turn.

Other studies suggest that, at least among certain groups and subcultures, an even more ambivalent attitude towards Islam in particular, and religion in general, can be discerned. Almost 40% of respondents who took part in an internet survey conducted by Association des Chercheurs Iraniens (ACI – “Association of Iranian Researchers”) in 2007 from within Iran declared themselves as nonreligious, while another 6.5 percent declared their religions as something other than Islam – both unusually high percentages for a country where official figures declare as high as 99.34% of the population as Muslims.[4]  To make the matter sound even more astounding, only 15.6 percent of men and 22.5 percent of women who participated in the survey declared that they practice their religions!

Although the survey results can hardly be considered representative of Iran’s population, it does imply that highly-educated young urban Iranians harbor a much less positive view of religion than the population at large. This is distressing for a society in which religion has long been an indispensible source of individual and collective identity. It is, therefore, not surprising that an increasing number of researchers have spoken about anomie among Iranian youth. In an analysis of a survey conducted by his team of 2500 young Iranians living in 10 major cities, Dr. Parviz Piran asserts that two tendencies are clearly visible among the younger generation of Iranians.[5] First is their alienation from social norms and values coupled with an inclination towards antisocial behavior, crime and addiction. Second, and perhaps more interestingly, is a visible inclination among them to pretend that they have internalized the formal rules of conduct attached to the roles that their society has assigned to them, while in fact they do not believe in those rules at all. According to Piran, individuals showing this inclination have usually developed two distinct and often contradictory lifestyles – one in their private lives, and the other in public. Piran discreetly blames the experience of life under constant fear of arrest, humiliation and punishment for “trivial” matters as the main cause of anomie among Iranian youth.

What Piran is, in effect, implying is that the Iranian theocracy’s failure to recognize its people’s civil rights and liberties lies at the very root of the current state of anomie that has overtaken the younger generation. The Iranian Revolution put Iran’s Shi’a clergy in a position to use the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches of the country to officially implement the very principles and values which they once could only preach. However, in their fervor to uphold these principles, what they chose to overlook was the fact that any raw attempt to reduce religion to law is likely to infringe upon the basic rights and liberties of individuals. This is due to the fact that unlike civil law, whose proposed goal is solely to regulate human social interaction in order to minimize harm, religion intends to transform an individual’s behavior, not just in the public domain but also in the private sphere. In Abdu’l-Baha’s words:

In the religion of God there is no freedom of deeds. No one can transgress the divine law, even if in so doing he harms no one. For by the divine law is intended the training of oneself and others. For to God, harming oneself or harming others are the same, and both are reprehensible. In hearts there must be the fear of God, and human beings must not commit blameworthy deeds. Therefore, the freedom of deeds that exists in civil law does not exist in religion.[6]

Law is primarily enforced by appeal to a direct threat of punishment, or an often indirect promise of reward. Fear of being caught and punished is enough to convince most people to obey the law most of the time. While this sounds sufficient in case of civil law where the proposed goal is to regulate, an outward regulation of behavior can hardly meet the purpose of religion, which is to nurture human beings and humanity. A religious system which chooses to train humanity by those means with which civil law is applied will not just fail in its goal, but will also severely limit the freedom of its subjects. It is due to this fact that Baha’i writings assert that while social order is upheld by means of reward and punishment, the banner of religion is uplifted by Khashiyat Allah, or the fear of God:

The word of God which the Abha Pen hath revealed and inscribed on the first leaf of the Most Exalted Paradise is this: Verily I say: The fear of God hath ever been a sure defense and a safe stronghold for all the peoples of the world. It is the chief cause of the protection of mankind, and the supreme instrument for its preservation.[7]

“Khashiyat Allah” is a Quranic term that refers to a sense of awe and reverence inspired by an individual’s recognition of the majesty of God. According to Tousi, khashiyat defers from khauf (fear) in that while khauf is a painful feeling brought on by the prospect of punishment, khashiyat is an emotional state induced by an individual’s recognition of the Absolute Greatness of God.[8] While both khauf and khashyiat are seen as psychological states that can cause obedience to God, the two operate differently. In the case of khashyiat, obedience is caused not by fear of punishment, but by the love of God.

The distinction between khauf and khashyiat finds expression in Baha’i writings:

In formulating the principles and laws a part hath been devoted to penalties which form an effective instrument for the security and protection of men. However, dread (khauf) of the penalties maketh people desist only outwardly from committing vile and contemptible deeds, while that which guardeth and restraineth man both outwardly and inwardly hath been and still is the fear of God (khashiyat Allah). It is man’s true protector and his spiritual guardian. It behoveth him to cleave tenaciously unto that which will lead to the appearance of this supreme bounty.[9]

Baha’i writings enjoin upon the leaders of the world to uphold religion, asserting that peace, justice, and welfare depend not only on the rule of law, but also on the authority of religion and the influence of khashiyat Allah:

When the Day-Star of Wisdom rose above the horizon of God’s Holy Dispensation it voiced this all-glorious utterance: They that are possessed of wealth and invested with authority and power must show the profoundest regard for religion. In truth, religion is a radiant light and an impregnable stronghold for the protection and welfare of the peoples of the world, for the fear of God impelleth man to hold fast to that which is good, and shun all evil. Should the lamp of religion be obscured, chaos and confusion will ensue, and the lights of fairness and justice, of tranquility and peace cease to shine. Unto this will bear witness every man of true understanding.[10]

If the edifice of religion shakes and totters, commotion and chaos will ensue and the order of things will be utterly upset, for in the world of mankind there are two safeguards that protect man from wrongdoing. One is the law which punishes the criminal; but the law prevents only the manifest crime and not the concealed sin; whereas the ideal safeguard, namely, the religion of God, prevents both the manifest and the concealed crime, trains man, educates morals, compels the adoption of virtues and is the all-inclusive power which guarantees the felicity of the world of mankind. But by religion is meant that which is ascertained by investigation and not that which is based on mere imitation, the foundation of Divine Religions and not human imitations.[11]

Abdu’l-Baha’s assertion, in the above quote, that the authority of religion rests on its being “ascertained by investigation” and not “based on mere imitation”, reflects the fact that the influence of religion, unlike law, ultimately depends on the internal motivation of the believer rather than the external sway of reward and retribution. Even though from a Baha’i perspective khashiyat can superficially be defined as “the fear of God’s retribution or the hope of His reward”, Baha’i scripture attest that ultimately, a true Baha’i is expected to make her life’s choices independently of any such promise. This is perhaps most movingly demonstrated in Baha’u'llah’s Panj Kanz:

…I will tell you which people are worthy of listening to My utterances and attaining My presence. Suppose that a person is taken to a vast plain, on the right side of which are placed all the glories of this world, its pleasures and comfort, together with a sovereignty which would be everlasting and freed from every affliction and grief. On the left-hand side of this plain are preserved for eternity all the calamities, hardships, pains and immense sufferings. Then suppose that the Holy Spirit appears before this person and addresses him in these words: “Shouldst thou choose to have all the eternal pleasures that are placed on the right side in preference to the calamities on the left, not the slightest thing would be reduced from thy station in the sight of God. And shouldst thou choose to be inflicted with innumerable sufferings that are placed on the left, not the slightest thing would be added to thy station in the estimation of God, the Almighty, the Unconstrained.” ‘If at that moment this person were moved to choose, with the utmost eagerness and enthusiasm, the left hand of abasement rather than the right hand of glory, then he would be worthy to attain My presence and hearken to My exalted words. In this connection the Tongue of Grandeur, addressing the inquirers, says “If thine aim be to cherish thy life, approach not our court; but if sacrifice be thy heart’s desire, come and let others come with thee. For such is the way of faith, if in thy heart thou seekest reunion with Baha; Shouldst thou refuse to tread this path, why trouble us?[12]

It is, therefore, not surprising that in the very first few paragraphs of Kitab-i-Aqdas (The Most Holy Book – the basic text of Baha’i law), “the Charter of the future world civilization”, Baha’u'llah calls upon His followers to obey His commandments, not in anticipation of an external reward, but through love:

The Tongue of My power hath, from the heaven of My omnipotent glory, addressed to My creation these words: “Observe My commandments, for the love of My beauty.”[13]

By choosing primarily to appeal to its subjects’ deep-felt devotion, the Kitab-i-Aqdas demonstrates that its mandate differs from that of many other codes of law. Perhaps this difference of mandate becomes most pronounced when the writings proceed to make the very implementation of the “laws of God” conditional upon wisdom, tact, and prudence; upon their not being in conflict with the law of the land; and upon the capacity of a society to tolerate those laws. It is in light of all this that, in the course of a thorough discussion of the dangers of direct involvement of religious leadership in politics in his Risalih-i Siyasiyyih (Treatise on Leadership), ‘Abdu’l-Bahá argues that religious leaders should act as legislators of Divine laws, but leave the choice of their implementation to the wisdom and discretion of the state:

These souls are the fountainhead of the interpretation [Tashrii', "legislation"] of God’s commandments, not of implementation. That is, when the government requests an explanation concerning the requirements of the Law of God and the realities of the divine ordinances, in principle or in a specific case, they must explain what they have deduced from the commands of God and what is in accordance with the law of God. Apart from this, what awareness do they have of questions of leadership and social development, the administration and control of weighty matters, the welfare and prosperity of the kingdom, the improvement of procedures and codes of law, or foreign affairs and domestic policy?[14]

It can now be safely claimed that if the Iranian clergy had chosen to assume such a role, the Islamic Republic would most probably have evolved into a much more competent and democratic system of government, one in which religion would lead but not coerce. Unfortunately, however, the experience of the Islamic Republic has once again demonstrated that it is only as long as religion succeeds in upholding its principles, values, laws, and ordinances by appeal to the voluntary choice of a government and people quickened by khashiyat and love that it can successfully contribute to the advancement of humanity. Because of this, while the prospect of quickly upholding the cherished values and goals of a religious system by other means might sound tempting at first, one should never become oblivious of the fact that by doing so religion can be adversely reduced to legalism.

If anything, a theocracy thus needs to uphold the civil rights and liberties of its people more than any other system of government. Failure to do so can lead, not just to the creation of yet another dictatorship, but also the destruction of the very norms and values that hold that society together. In the case of Iran, fortunately there are signs that indicate that large portions of society have so far succeeded in safeguarding their long-cherished values by drawing a line between the Islamic Republic’s intolerant legalistic religion and their own private understandings of a much kinder and more tolerant Islam. This situation, however, cannot keep on forever. In the end, the Islamic Republic will need to find the incentive and insight to reinvent itself as a system that  on the one hand is inspired by Islamic values and principles, and on the other is willing to uphold the rights and liberties of its people. Failure to do so can have potentially devastating consequences, both for Iran and for Shi’a Islam.

[1] http://www.gallup.com/poll/28762/Majorities-Muslims-Americans-See-Religion-Law-Compatible.aspx

[2] http://www.gallup.com/poll/108724/Iranians-Egyptians-Turks-Contrasting-Views-Sharia.aspx

[3] Kazemipour & Rezaei, “Religious Life Under Theocracy: The Case of Iran”, Journal for the scientific study of religion, 2003.

[4] Hossein Ladjevardi, Navid Fazel, Iranian Identity and the Future of Iran, http://aciiran.com/survey1.htm

[5] Parviz Piran, Iranian Youth and Social Transformation: Review of a Research, http://publications.ksu.edu.sa/Conferences/Children%20Youth%20Conference/Article068.pdf

[6] Translated by Juan R.I. Cole, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jrcole/abconsc.htm.  در دين اللّه حريّت اعمال نيست از قانون الهی نميتواند انسان تجاوز نمايد ولو ضرری بغير نرساند چه مقصود از قانون الهی تربيت غير و خود است چه عند اللّه ضرر خود و غير يکسان و هر دو مذموم است بايد در قلوب خشية اللّه باشد و انسان بآنچه عند اللّه مذموم است مرتکب نشود  لذا حريّت اعماليکه در قانون است در دين نيست.(مائده آسمانی، جلد 5)

[7] Baha’u'llah, Tablets of Baha’u'llah, p. 62

[8] الفروق اللغویه، ابی هلال العسكری، سیدنورالدین الجزائری

[9] Baha’u'llah, Tablets of Baha’u'llah, p. 92

[10] Baha’u'llah, Tablets of Baha’u'llah, p. 125

[11] Abdu’l-Baha, Baha’i World Faith – Abdu’l-Baha Section, p. 288

[12] Adib Taherzadeh, The Revelation of Baha’u'llah v 2, p. 140

[13] Baha’u'llah, The Kitab-i-Aqdas, p.20

[14] Translated by Sen McGlinn, http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/~bahai/trans/vol7/govern.htm. اين نفوس مصدر تشريع احکام الهی هستند نه تنفيذ يعنی چون حکومت در امور کلّيّه و جزئيّه مقتضای شريعت الهيّه و حقيقت احکام ربّانيّه را استفسار نمايد آنچه مستنبط از احکام اللّه و موافق شريعت اللّه است بيان نمايند ديگر در امور سياسی و رعيّت پروری و ضبط و ربط مهامّ امور و  صلاح و فلاح ملکی و تمشيت  قواعد  و قانون مملکتی و امور خارجی و داخلی چه اطّلاع دارند (عبدالبهاء، رساله سیاسیه، طهران 1934)

Iran Press Watch hopes to be able to publish a translation of these questions in a near future (but should one of our esteemed readers wish to offer a summary translation, that would be most welcome).

32 Questions (Persian) [PDF]

The treatment of Baha’is has occupied my thoughts and has disturbed my peace. You might be surprised, but when I see tyranny and oppression inflicted on Baha’is, and increasing on a daily basis, I feel a heavy load on my shoulders.

On one hand, National Identification Cards for Baha’is have not commenced being issued yet; but on the other hand, there are discussions about passing a law in the Egyptian parliament categorizing Baha’is as criminals, and deciding on the charges to be levied against them for their alleged apostasy.

To date, I have not heard whether arson charges have been brought against those who set the homes of a few Baha’is on fire. I also do not know the fate of the Baha’is who had to flee from their burning homes.

God, should anyone who accepts a different religion be subjected to so much cruelty? Is this what has become of human beings who were created noble by their creator, a creator who sends messengers with heavenly books and has given his creatures the freedom to choose their own path, and only requires that they be responsible to their Lord?

What I see in the Qur’an is the glorious verse: “Let there be no compulsion in religion” [Qur'an 2:256].  What is clearly evident from this verse and from the entire Holy Qur’an is that neither entering Islam nor exiting from it, nor even following or not following its commandments is compulsory.  However, there are ignorant clergy who believe that the freedom to choose is limited to entering Islam, while exiting is prohibited and punishable by the death penalty.

I consider it necessary to address a question that has been of utmost importance in recent days.  The question is: “What is apostasy, and are Baha’is apostates?”  I want you all to listen carefully with open minds to what is offered here. Even though this topic has been documented in scriptures for ages and ages and has been accessible to all, historically it has been overlooked.

Before starting the discussion, I should clarify that the verses in God’s book are the first guideline for the establishment of laws.  I would also like to share a tradition from Moaz Ibn Jabal who says that the Prophet Mohammad addressed him saying, “If you are asked to make a judgment, what would you base your judgment on?”  He responded, “First I refer to God’s Holy Book for guidance; if I cannot find a reference, I will refer to the Prophet’s traditions; and if I still cannot find the answer, I will use my own judgment”.  The Prophet Mohammad praised him and said, “Praise be to God that you have succeeded in carrying out the will of God”.  Consequently, if the response to the question of apostasy was documented in the Holy Qur’an, there would be no need for referring to other sources of information.

Let us investigate God’s commandment in the Qur’an in relation to apostasy.  The law is cited in the verse: “Nor will they cease fighting you until they turn you back from your faith if they can. And if any of you turn back from their faith and die in unbelief, their works will bear no fruit in this life and in the Hereafter; they will be Companions of the Fire and will abide therein” [Qur'an 2:217].

Regarding the implications of these verses and the meaning of “fire”, we read the interpretation of Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Reza (1865 -1925), pupil of Imam Muhammad Abduh: “at the time of weakness and fewness of Muslims, non-believers adhering to oppression and torture were forcing Muslims to recant their faith. This is how they made Emar Ibn Yaser and his family, Balal, Sahib, and others renounce Islam. When Muslims migrated from Mecca to Medina and their numbers increased, they initiated a war against non-believers, and God, praised be his name, revealed the verses stated above. The word “infidel” was mentioned when Muslims were declaring their belief through holy war, indicating that all the good deeds of those exiting Islam would be wiped out in this world and in the world to come, since turning away from religion is turning away from the three main tenets of the faith[1].

All messengers of God have confirmed these three principals. No one who has recognized and accepted these principals will cast them away, unless he is corrupt and filled with hatred.  Such a person will have no abode but hell and will eternally remain therein.

Let us continue discussing our serious and important question: “Have Baha’is abandoned the three principals?”  I leave this judgment to the readers. However, if you were to ask me, I would say that Baha’is believe in God and believe in the next world.  With respect to good deeds and moral conduct, I should say among them are those who adorn themselves with goodly deeds and those who do not, just as with the followers of all the other religions.

In summary, based on the Qur’an, apostasy is conversion from the belief in God and of the Unity of God to disbelief. Only a person who changes his belief in God to denial and negation of God, and to disbelief in the continuation of life in the next world, can be labeled an apostate.

The Holy Qur’an clearly promises the Lord’s reward to all those who believe and conduct their lives based on the three principals: “Those who believe (in the Qur’an) and those who follow the Jewish (Scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians, and who believe in Allah and the last day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve” [Qur'an 2:62].

In conclusion, we know that many label Baha’is as apostates. Even if we were to accept that accusation, the law of God concerning such individuals is that they are condemned to remain in hell eternally, but no tyranny and oppression should be inflicted on them in this world. We can only say: “Ye have your religion and I my religion” [Qur'an 109:06].

Notes:

[1] The three principals are:

a: the world is created by a mighty and powerful Creator, and He is the only One Who should be worshiped,

b: belief in the next world and life after death,

c: practicing goodly deeds and seemly conduct that will benefit the individual himself and all the creation of God.

[Published on May 5, 2009 at: http://basmagm.wordpress.com/2009/05/05/%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A9/. Translation by Iran Press Watch.]

Selected as a “Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2007”, The Blackwell Companion to the Qur’an (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), edited by Canadian Islamicist, Andrew Rippin, has been hailed as “undoubtedly the best single-volume introduction to Islam’s sacred text currently available in English” (Choice, January 2007).  Well-published scholar, Dr. Christopher Buck, contributed a lead chapter, “Discovering” [the Qur'an] (pp. 18–35). The section, “How to Read the Qur’an,” begins as follows:

A nineteenth-century mystic once said that the Qur’an eclipses all of the miracles of all of the previous prophets, for the miracle of the Qur’an, alone, remains (Shirazi 1950; Lawson 1988). That is to say, the staff of Moses may have turned into a serpent and swallowed up the magicians’ snakes in Pharaoh’s court, but that prophetic scepter has vanished. Moses may well have parted the Red Sea, as Muslims themselves believe, but that prodigy is long gone. No empirical evidence of either miracle remains today.

What alone abides is the “miracle” of the Qur’an – its prodigious ability to transform the lives of those who believe and accept the Qur’an as the best guide for their lives. This transformation is spiritual alchemy, taking the base appetites that most of us are born with and transmuting these into the pure gold of a refined moral and spiritual character. The Qur’an can transform a pair of horns into a set of wings, changing the pious believer from a devil into an angel. Such is the nature of Muslim belief about the Qur’an.

The Qur’an can and should be taught in the university – not to convert students into pious Muslims, but to convert pious Muslim beliefs into something students can understand, so that they can appreciate the power of the book to influence those who believe in it. However, beyond the question of why the Qur’an should be taught, there is the problem of how it should be taught. In whatever course and context it may be taught, the challenge is to engage readers in the study of this text, to assist them in discovering the Qur’an for themselves.

While “Discovering” is now required reading in several Islamic studies courses across America, there is something else that is significant about this introductory chapter to the “best single-volume introduction to Islam’s sacred text currently available in English.” The author, Dr. Buck, is a member of the Baha’i Faith since 1972.  This fact is significant in that many Muslims mistakenly believe that Baha’is are anti-Islam.  While Baha’is are certainly against any form of oppression — that is, Baha’is decry any deprivation of civil and human rights purportedly done in the name of “Islam” — Baha’is are probably the greatest witnesses to the truth and beauty of the Qur’an (the holy book of Islam) besides pious Muslims themselves!

“Discovering” — authored by a Baha’i — is simply a public representation of that very fact.  How ironic, then, is the persecution of Baha’is by professedly “Muslim” clerics and state officials in Iran!

A Persian translation of “Discovering” [the Qur'an] is available for download, along with the original publication in English. The Persian translation was undertaken by a Baha’i who was imprisoned for several years in Iran simply for being a Baha’i.  For security reasons, therefore, the translator’s name remains anonymous.

buck_blackwell_quran_2006

buck_quran_persian

History of Husayn’s Martyrdom

The Baha’i writer and scholar Jonah Winters in his brilliant Dying for God: Martyrdom in the Shi‘i and Babi Religions (University of Toronto Master Thesis, 1997) has a chapter titled, “Martyrdom And Suffering In Shi’ism”.  In this chapter he notes:

At one point the Muslims of the city of Kufa, in Iraq, invited Husayn to visit them, whereupon they would publicly acclaim him as the caliph and sole legitimate ruler of the Muslim world.  So many thousands of Kufans wrote to Husayn that, though advised not to by wise friends, he decided to honor the request.  Husayn recognized well in advance that the Kufans, ambivalent and lacking steadfastness, might prove unfaithful.  Were he to decline the invitation, though, it would signal his willingness to abide by the manifestly unjust and amoral rule of Yazid and thereby precipitate a complete fall of his grandfather’s religion.  Yazid, for his part, recognized that, were the Kufans to honor their pledge and proclaim support for Husayn, his own hold on power would become very tenuous.  He had to stop Husayn.

Yazid commissioned ‘Ibn Ziyad, an appointee of Mu‘awiya, as governor of Iraq.  ‘Ibn Ziyad, upon arriving at his post, threatened all who might support Husayn with torture and death, and thereby convinced all of Husayn’s declared supporters to abandon their oaths to Husayn and turn against him.  By this time, though, Husayn had already departed for Kufa with about seventy of his followers and was not aware of his supporters’ change of heart.  Husayn did have the foresight to send an advance envoy to Kufa to reassess his support there, but this scout was captured and beheaded before being able to warn Husayn of the changed situation.  Husayn continued on his way, not knowing that ‘Ibn Ziyad had dispatched an army of thousands to meet and stop him.  By the second night of the month of Muharram in the year 61 A.H. (2 October C.E. 680), Husayn had reached an area known as the plains of Karbala, a few dozen miles from Kufa.  They were camping there when the army of ‘Ibn Ziyad came upon them.  The two groups stood in a standoff for a few days, the army waiting to secure Husayn’s oath of allegiance for Yazid and Husayn and his group of followers negotiating for their freedom.

By the ninth day of Muharram neither Husayn nor the opposing army had yielded, and ‘Ibn Ziyad sent word that the army was to wait no longer.  That night Husayn addressed his followers, saying that the army wanted no one’s blood but his own and that all were free to make use of the cover of darkness and escape.  Morning dawned, but none had left.

This, the tenth day of Muharram, or ashura (‘ashura’, meaning “tenth”), was to be the day of their deaths.  Seeking a peaceful settlement, a path he believed Muhammad would have chosen, Husayn approached his adversaries with offers of reconciliation. Though unsuccessful, he did convince a few among the enemy to join his side.  The rest then began their slaughter.  They surrounded Husayn’s small band, preventing them from reaching the nearby Euphrates to get much-needed water and killing any who tried.  Husayn even tried carrying forward his dehydrated infant son and pleading for a drop of water to keep him from dying of thirst.  The child was shot in the throat.  With the death of his infant child, Husayn sunk down at the door of his tent to pray and grieve for all those who had been killed that morning.

By noon, not one of the fighting men among Husayn’s followers was left alive. Husayn appealed once again to ‘Ibn Ziyad’s army.  He reminded them with loving and respectful words that they and their fellow Kufans had pledged to support him, the grandson of the Prophet, and tried to convince them to end the slaughter.  This proved to be but an invitation for the battle’s most inglorious episode: Husayn himself was shot.  He asked for a brief respite to say the noonday prayer and say good-bye to his family, which was granted.  But no sooner had he finished praying than the final assault began in earnest.  The enemy swooped upon him like birds of prey, landing so many arrows and blows of the sword upon him that he fell from his horse.  They continued to attack his helpless body, but still he clung to the last strands of life.  This tenacity inspired such awe that none would deal him the coup de grace.  A man named Shemr [that is, Shamir ibn Dhi al-Jawshan], sent by ‘Ibn Ziyad to accompany the army specifically for his quality of unadulterated immorality and brutality, stepped forward and struck off Husayn’s head.

The army of four thousand, now having completed its victory over a band of seventy men dying of thirst, raised the heads of the dead on spears and, leading the roped women and children still alive, returned to Kufa.

Following their martyrdom, the bodies of Husayn and his companions were trampled on by horsemen, and then left for three days on the plain of Karbala; in October of 680 AD (61 AH) they were buried by a passing tribe at the same spot.  In August of 684, a small mosque was erected on the site, consisting of two entrances and a single dome. In June 787 AD, during the reign of Al-Rashid, the dome and roof were destroyed.  The building was reconstructed in October of 808 AD by Amin.  This reconstruction was demolished by Mutawakkil who ordered that the land should be ploughed.  Between 861 and 886 AD, the gravesite was marked only by a single iron pillar.  In August 977 AD, Adzd ‘Ibn Boweih rebuilt the roof, the dome and the sepulcher, added houses to surround the site, and raised a wall around the city.  These buildings were damaged by fire in 1016 AD, and were rebuilt.  In 1365 AD, Sultan Owais ‘Ibn Hasan Jalairi remodeled the dome and raised the walls of the enclosure.  In 1514 AD, Shah Ismail Saffawi visited the holy shrine and he added an inlaid sarcophagus over the grave.  In July, 1796 AD the Qajar monarch, Muhammad Shah, covered the dome of the shrine with gold.  His grandson, Nasir’id-Din Shah, extended the courtyard of the shrine in May of 1866 AD.

Effect of Husayn’s Martyrdom by the Bab and Baha’u’llah

Nabil has related the following account from the time of the Bab’s imprisonment at Mah-Ku (The Dawn-breakers, pp. 251-52):

A winter followed of such exceptional severity that even the copper implements were affected by the intensity of the cold. The beginning of that season coincided with the month of Muharram of the year 1264 A.H. The water which the Bab used for His ablutions was of such icy coldness that its drops glistened as they froze upon His face. He would invariably, after the termination of each prayer, summon Siyyid Husayn to His presence and would request him to read aloud to Him a passage from the Muhriqu’l-Qulub, a work composed by the late Haji Mulla Mihdi, the great-grandfather of Haji Mirza Kamalu’d-Din-i-Naraqi, in which the author extols the virtues, laments the death, and narrates the circumstances of the martyrdom of the Imam Husayn.  The recital of those sufferings would provoke intense emotion in the heart of the Bab.  His tears would keep flowing as He listened to the tale of the unutterable indignities heaped upon him, and of the agonizing pain which he was made to suffer at the hands of a perfidious enemy.

Concerning the effects of Husayn’s sacrifice, Baha’u’llah writes (Summons of the Lord of Hosts, M52):

By the righteousness of God! Through his deed the fragrances of holiness were wafted over all things, the proof of God was perfected, and His testimony made manifest to all men.”

Furthermore, in the Kitab-i Iqan (pp. 127-28), Baha’u’llah writes:

For instance, consider the pervading power of those drops of the blood of Husayn which besprinkled the earth. What ascendancy and influence hath the dust itself, through the sacredness and potency of that blood, exercised over the bodies and souls of men! So much so, that he who sought deliverance from his ills was healed by touching the dust of that holy ground, and whosoever, wishing to protect his property, treasured, with absolute faith and understanding, a little of that holy earth within his house, safeguarded all his possessions. These are the outward manifestations of its potency. And were We to recount its hidden virtues they would assuredly say: ‘He verily hath considered the dust to be the Lord of Lords, and hath utterly forsaken the Faith of God.’

Significance of Husayn’s Martyrdom from scholars’ perspective

William McCants in “The Wronged One: Shi’ih Narrative Structure in Baha’u’llah’s Tablet of Visitation for Mullah Husayn”, notes:

The central position of Husayn’s martyrdom in the formation of Shi’ih identity can find no greater parallel in religious writing than the Passion of Jesus of Nazareth. Both men, as portrayed in later accounts, were betrayed by their followers.  Both were left to die alone and abandoned, pierced with wounds and mourned by a few pious women. Death, however, was merely a vehicle for victory in both narratives, granting lasting influence to the men who had offered up their lives for Truth and thereby demonstrated the falsity of their persecutors acts. This core narrative of betrayal, abandonment, suffering, martyrdom, and victory forms the emotional center of both Christianity and Shi’ih Islam.

Commenting on Husayn’s possible motivations and the impact of his sacrifice, S.H.M. Jafri, a modern Shi’ih historian, has written:

… it is clear that Husayn was fully aware of the dangers he would encounter and that he had a certain strategy and plan in mind to bring about a revolution in the consciousness of the Muslim community. Furthermore, it is also very clear from the sources, as has been started before, that Husayn did not try to organize or mobilize military support, which he easily could have done in the Hijaz, nor did he even try to exploit whatever physical strength was available to him…

Is it conceivable that anyone striving for power would ask his supporters to abandon him?… What then did Husayn have in mind? Why was he still heading for Kufa?

It is rather disappointing to note that Western scholarship on Islam, given too much to historicism, has placed all its attention on the discrete external aspects of the event of Karbala and has never tried to analyze the inner history and agonizing conflict in Husayn’s mind… A careful study and analysis of the events of  Karbala as a whole reveals the fact that from the very beginning Husayn was planning for a complete revolution in the religious consciousness of the Muslims. All of his actions show that he was aware of the fact that a victory achieved through military strength and might is always temporal [sic], because another stronger power can in course of time bring it down in ruins. But victory achieved through suffering and sacrifice is everlasting and leaves permanent imprints on man’s consciousness… The natural process of conflict and struggle between action and reaction was now at work. That is, Muhammad’s progressive Islamic action had succeeded in suppressing Arab conservatism, embodied in heathen pre-Islamic practices and ways of thinking. But in less than thirty years’ time this Arab conservatism revitalized itself as a forceful reaction to challenge Muhammad’s action once again.. The strength of this reaction, embodied in Yazid’s character, was powerful enough to suppress or at least deface Muhammad’s action. Islam as now, in the thinking Husayn, was in dire need of reactivation of Muhammad’s action against the old Arabian reactions and thus required a complete shake-up…

Husayn’s acceptance of Yazid, with the latter’s openly reactionary attitude against Islámic norms, would not have meant merely a political arrangement, as had been the case with Hasan and Mu’awiya, but an endorsement of Yazid’s character and way of life as well…

Husayn prepared his strategy… He realized that more force of arms would not have saved Islamic action and consciousness. To him it needed a shaking and jolting of hearts and feelings. This, he decided, could only be achieved through sacrifice and suffering. This should not be difficult to understand, especially for those who fully appreciate the heroic deeds and sacrifices of, for example, Socrates and Joan of Arc, both of whom embraced death for their ideals, and above all of the great sacrifice of Jesus Christ for the redemption of mankind.

It is in this light that we should read Husayn’s replies to those well-wishers who advised him not to go to ‘Iraq. It also explains why Husayn took with him his women and children, though advised by ‘Ibn Abbas [his father’s cousin] that should he insist on his project, at least he should not take his family with him. Aware of the extent of the brutal nature of the reactionary forces, Husayn knew that after killing him, the Umayyads would make his women and children captive and take them all the way from Kufa to Damascus. This caravan of captives of Muhammad’s immediate family would publicize Husayn’s message and would force the Muslims’ hearts to ponder on the tragedy. It would make the Muslims think of the whole affair and would awaken their consciousness. This is exactly what happened. Husayn succeeded in his purposes. It is difficult today to evaluate exactly the impact of Husayn’s action on Islamic morality and way of thinking, because it prevailed. Had Husayn not shaken and awakened Muslim consciousness by this method, who knows whether Yazid’s way of life would have become standard behavior in the Muslim community, endorsed and accepted by the grandson of the Prophet.  No doubt, even after Yazid kingship did prevail in Islam, and the character and behavior in the personal lives of these kings was not very different from that Yazid, but the change of thinking which prevailed after the sacrifice of Husayn always served as a line of distinction between Islamic norms and the personal character of the rulers.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the impact and importance of the martyrdom of Husayn for Shi’ihs. Although it was the usurpation of ‘Ali’s right that is looked upon by Shí’íhs as the event initiating their movement and giving it intellectual justification, it was Husayn’s martyrdom that gave it its impetus and implanted its ideas deep in the heart of the people.  To this day it is the martyrdom of Husayn that is the most fervently celebrated event in the Shi’ih calendar.  During the first ten days of Muharram, the whole Shi’ih world is plunged into mourning.

Above all, the martyrdom of Husayn has given Shi’ih Islam a whole ethos of sanctification through martyrdom.  Although the Shi’ihs were persecuted all through their early history and, according to their traditions, every single one of the Imams suffered martyrdom, it is above all the martyrdom of Husayn that has given this characteristic to Shi’ih Islam; a characteristic that recent events in Iran have demonstrated to be as strong as ever.

At the start of this conference Hassan Assadi, the spokesman for the Committee to Pursue Arbitrary Arrests and the organizers of the conference said the goal of this gathering is to “promote a progressive and compassionate view of Divine religions based on peaceful co-existence among all people”. 

Stressing the right to freedom of religion as a fundamental human right in international laws, he said: “In recent months cases have been reported to the Committee to Pursue Arbitrary Arrests that show an increase in judicial confrontations with members of other religions or those who have converted to other religions. Today’s meeting is in fact to discuss views that show this backward interpretation of religion and that it does not meet the requirements of the modern world.” 

But as the main speaker of this conference, Dr. Hashem Aghajari, professor of history at Tarbyat-e Moddaress [Teacher Training] University said: “Our compatriots who follow other religions should know that discrimination is not limited to them. We are dealing with a hierarchical system that, in addition to non-Muslims, discriminates against those who do not believe in any of the Divine religions and Muslims alike. Today we can see that in this land and in the name of Shi’ism there are limitations for Sunni Muslims. This discrimination has extended even to Shi’i sects when Sufis and Imami Shi’is and the Dervishes have seen the destruction of their religious centers in recent years.”

Hashem Aghajari said he was sorry that this discrimination against those who think differently or follow a different religion is done in the name of religion and Islam. He said: “Today we are seeing an extremely limited definition of “us” and “them” of government and people, to the extent that only a small minority from the vast array of Muslims and Iranians, those who adhere to a special understanding of Islam and Shi’ism, and within Shi’ism only those who adhere to the principle of faqih [religious jurist] and velayat-e faqih [principle of rule of religious jurist], and even within this circle those who adhere to a fundamentalist interpretation of religion can enjoy rights. And all this limited interpretation is happening when the Holy Book of Muslims, the Qur’an, the prophetic tradition, the life of the prophet and religious leaders and Imams, even the history of Muslim societies shows that they accepted and welcomed other thinkers and followers of other religions.” 

He then referred to the ratification of the Islamic punitive law in the Majles in which for the first time the concept of “ertedad” [apostasy] and punishment for “mortad” [apostate] has been discussed. He said this is a novelty and ratification of this law will give justification for pressures against our compatriots in the name of defending religion.  

Posing the question, where in religion do we find authorization for suppressing ideas, Aghajari said: “There is no connection between ideas and compulsion in the Holy Qur’an. The Holy Qur’an clearly states that there is no compulsion in religion. Therefore, based on the verses of the Holy Qur’an, we cannot, on the pretext of responsibility, use force and compulsion in imposing religion and preventing the freedom of choice.”

For this reason Aghajari says uniformity in ideas and beliefs is only possible through compulsion and propaganda. According to him, if God wanted to he would have created a single umma [community] with a single belief, but he created different ideas. 

He continued: “Those who want to create uniformity through force instead of persuasion, and sometimes in the guise of the law, are standing in opposition to the logic of the Qur’an. Nowhere in the Qur’an do we find authorization for force to impose an idea.” 

Aqajary then concluded: “People are created different and they think differently. Everyone is seeking the truth but no one can impose his truth or belief on others through compulsion to create uniformity.” 

Stating that the situation of followers of other religions is very clear in the Qur’an, this professor of history then said: “The Holy Qur’an orders us to live in peace with other religions.” Referring to the tradition of the prophet in dealing with other religions, Aghajari said: “Which of the wars of the prophet was to impose an idea by force?” 

On the strictness and severities in the history of Islam, Aghajari said: “These severities were more political not religious in nature; they had to do with political dominance. All critics and opponents, Shi’i or Sunni, were oppressed by the Ummayads [first caliphs in Islam].

Referring to the last one hundred years and the emphasis that the post revolution constitution has on the rights of all people in this land, Aghajari said: “If anyone violates this covenant then he cannot claim legitimacy through this document. In this law the freedom of thought is acknowledged and the followers of other religions are to enjoy the rights that all Iranians enjoy.”   

He said the experiences of the past three decades show progress in the area of the shari’a [Islamic law] by the progressive faqihs. He especially referred to the views of Ayatollah Montazeri about the Baha’is and their citizenry rights and said: “Here we are talking about the land. Citizenry rights are not just civil rights. This means that Iran is a land that belongs to all the people of Iran. These people own the land and rule the land therefore each and everyone is a citizen of this land.” 

Continuing, Aghajari stressed the issue of government versus people and that all members of Iranian society have equal rights. He said: “Today we have arrived at this understanding of freedom that it is not just the rule of the majority because this logic can lead to acts that violate others’ freedoms and to totalitarianism. Therefore along with the rule of the majority what becomes important is the rights of the minority based on fundamental human rights.” 

This religious researcher said he is happy that the concept of citizenry is entering fiqh [religious jurisprudence] and hoped that in the future we would have a fiqh in line with modern man. He asked: “How is it that those in Iran who do not allow the “other” to participate in the ruling establishment, do not respect their freedom of ideas and religion and speech, expect that their co-thinkers be given the same freedoms in other countries?” Aghajari said this viewpoint is contradictory in nature, “if this kind of oppression of the “other” is allowed in Iran then we are giving the authority for the same kind of oppression around the world.” Aghajari then concluded that the red line of the ruling majority should be fundamental human rights. 

In continuing Aghajari posed some questions, including “Today we are facing the paradox of those who are worried about people changing their religion and to deal with this they resort to the law of apostasy. At the same time Islam is growing rapidly in the heart of Europe. Why must we force women to wear the hejab [Islamic veil] while in other societies women freely choose to wear the hejab? Where in history do we find that the endurance of a faith is achieved through lashes, force, and hangings? Shouldn’t those in power revise their policies and know that these actions are one of the main reasons for people running away from Islam?”

Posing the question, is using force the way to deal with the young converting to Christianity and the expansion of Baha’ism, Aghajari said: “Based on the logic of Qur’an, a faith that is not chosen out of freedom is not really faith. Islam means free and informed choice. Even though God wants man to believe in him but in the Qur’an we do not have any verse that authorizes the punishment of death for an apostate.” 

In describing this issue he posed more questions: Who is an apostate? What is apostasy? If someone chooses a faith after doing research on it is he an apostate? He continued: “Many of our jurists have defined apostasy by referring to ignorance and animosity. Therefore apostasy is not accepting another religion based on truth, even if the person has made a mistake. It is seeking the truth and any human being seeking the truth may make a mistake.” Thus, he asked: “Do we kill a person who is seeking the truth but makes a mistake?” 

In continuing Aghajari referred to the views of some jurists who have said apostasy is a political concept not an ideological one and said: “Apostasy can be found in the politics of all pre-modern societies. Fortunately some of our progressive jurists have taken important steps in this area. In the fatwas [religious edicts] of many jurists there is no punishment for apostasy. Many jurists have even said the requirement for carrying out a punishment is the presence of an immaculate Imam.” 

Referring to the change in times and the issue of semi-proof, Aghajari said in those times the political and the ideological were combined. That is why when some people refer to the punishment of death in the first years of Islam it was not because of an ideological change of heart but for political treason. 

At the end of his talk Aghajari talked about a contracted reading of religion and that this kind of interpretation is in conflict with fundamental human rights. He said suppression of those who believe in other faiths is not out of the logic of religion but the logic of force and power. He concluded: “The logic of force and dominance through power is different than the logic of religion.” 

After Aghajari’s talk, Asadi Zeydabadi referred to Hashem Aghajari’s death sentence for apostasy after his speech in Hamedan and said the speech in that episode should be a message to those who want to enter apostasy as a crime in the country’s judicial system. He addressed them and said: “It is better that you do not ratify a worn out law that society today does not accept.” 

Seeking Help from the Head of Judiciary

Also at this conference, Mansour Osanlou’s mother who was too sick to go to the podium, asked Mazrzieh Mortazi Langaroudy, member of the society for defense of prisoners, to read a note to those present about the latest condition of his son. 

Marzieh Mortazi Langaroudi referred to the bylaws of prisoners in Iran. Considering the positive points in these bylaws, as recounted by the wife of Mansour Osanlou, Langaroudi talked about the efforts by his family in asking for a temporary release due to his medical condition, something which has not occurred so far despite their efforts. 

Osanlou’s medical condition was another issue discussed at this gathering. Putting hand cuffs and chains on his feet when transferring him to the hospital was something that many families were affected by and protested. 

Thus, along with Parvaneh Osanlou, Mansour Osanlou’s wife, who had asked Ayatollah Shahroudi to help her family, Mortazi Langaroudi also asked Shahroudi for his help in reviewing Mansour Osanlou and other political prisoners’ condition. 

After presenting a report on the condition of this labor activist [Osanlou], the issue of the Kurdish activists’ hunger strike in prison came up. Giving a short description of their condition due to the concerns of human rights activists became the next topic of discussion at the gathering. 

Kurdish Prisoners and Hunger Strike

At the request of the organizers of the conference Mohammad Ali Towfiqi, the political and civil activist, gave a short description of the bad condition of these prisoners, especially Hedayat Ghazami and Sabah Nasri, the two Kurdish students. He said: “Without a center-periphery look and while supporting these prisoners, national forces should ask that they end their hunger strike and pursue other ways to bring attention to their problems.” 

Then Asad Zeydabadi, as representative of the Committee to Pursue Arbitrary Arrests asked these prisoners to end their hunger strike on the occasion of Eid-e Fetr. 

Threatening Families of Political and Ideological Prisoners 

Wife of Alireza Sarrafi, the minority rights activist in Azarbayjan, also described her husband’s situation for those present at the conference. She talked about threats against the family after the arrest of her husband. 

At this moment Mansour Osanlou’s mother who had come and stood by Alireza Saffari’s wife because she was upset, asked the people present at the gathering to try harder to find out about the condition of prisoners and for their freedom. 

The problems that were created for some Iranian families who had traveled to Iraq to visit their family members who are living in Ashraf camp was the other issue discussed. One of these people who had participated in this gathering on the afternoon of Eid-e Fetr, gave a short report on the condition of his child who is a prisoner. Yazerlou talked about big collaterals he had to put down for her spouse and child. She talked about her child’s physical condition in prison and that he is awaiting a trial on 15 Aban [5 November]. 

[Nader Karami of Rooz Online has published a report of the Conference on Freedom of Ideas and Rights of Religious Minorities, which was held on Monday, 6 October 2008, at: http://www.roozonline.com/archives/2008/10/post_9439.php. Prof Hashem Aghajari spoke at this conference and his comments are shared above in translation by an anonymous contributor.]